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DETERRING FRAUD VS. AVOIDING THE "STRIKE SUIT*:
REACHING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE*
D. Brian Huffordt
INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Act")' and Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") thereunder,2 remain the pri-
mary basis upon which securities fraud cases are litigated in
the federal courts.3 The Act was designed "to deter fraud and
* @1995 D. Brian Hufford. All Rights Reserved.
t The author, a 1985 graduate from the Yale Law School, is a partner in the
law firm Pomerantz Haudek Block & Grossman. He specializes in securities class
actions on behalf of plaintiffs. Prior to joining Pomerantz Haudeh, the author
spent six years at Davis Polk & Wardwell, primarily defending securities actions
on behalf of corporate defendants. The opinions expressed in this Article are those
of the author and are not intended to reflect or represent the opinions of his firm.
From the author. This article is dedicated to my wife Wendy, and to our
three wonderful and precocious children: Ashley, Austen and Axel. Without their
love, support and tireless energy, life would have little meaning.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934). Section 10(b) makes it
unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in cennection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
2 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule 10b-5, adopted by the SEC to clarify the
reach of section 10(b), specifies that
[it shall be unlawful for any person... (a) [tlo employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [tlo make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
, To present a valid cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, plain-
tiffs must allege material misstatements or omissions that were knovingly or
recklessly made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Luca v.
Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986); see aLso Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U..
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manipulative practices in the securities market, and to ensure
full disclosure of information r~iaterial to investment deci-
sions."M Although not expressly provided for by Congress,
courts have long implied a private cause of action for investors
under the Act.5 They have done so "on the theory courts
should recognize private remedies to supplement federal statu-
tory duties, not on the theory Congress had given an unequivo-
cal direction to the courts to do so."' The private cause of ac-
tion has become a critical part of the enforcement mechanism
behind section 10(b). As the head of enforcement for the SEC
recently stated in expressing his support for a strong and ac-
tive securities plaintiffs' bar:
224, 230-31 (1988) (listing elements of 10(b) claim); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that scienter is required for 10(b) violations);
Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
recklessness is sufficient to show scienter under 10b-5).
' Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2090 (1993) (quoting Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)).
' Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196. ("Although § 10(b) does not by its terms create
an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress,
or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy, the
existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute and the Rule is
now well established."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
' Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730). The
Musick decision was issued at the same time that the Supreme Court was making
clear its strong reluctance to imply causes of action under the securities laws. See,
e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1448 (1994) (finding that a cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud
cannot be inferred under Section 10(b)). The Musick opinion does not suggest,
however, that there is any question about the existence of the implied cause of
action under Rule 10(b). In Musick, the Court took comfort in reinforcing its
conclusion that a private cause of action can be implied under the Act by two
recent statutes: (1) Section 20A(d) of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1993), which states that "nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit or condition . . . the availability of any
cause of action implied from a provision of this chapter;" and (2) 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa-1, the statute designed to limit the retroactive effect of Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Purpis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which inferred a
three-year statute of limitations period for private actions under Section 10(b).
That statute set forth the applicable limitation period "for any private civil action
implied under section 78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act] that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991 [the day prior to issuance of Lampf,
Pleva]." From these statutes, the Court inferred "an acknowledgement of the 10b-5
action without any further expression of legislative intent to define it." Musick,
113 S. Ct. at 2089.
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Due to the Commission's inability to address all violations, the im-
plied private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
thereunder is critically important to the effective operation of the
federal securities laws. As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly
over the last thirty years, private actions under the federal securi-
ties laws are a "necessary supplement" to the Commission's own
enforcement activities. Given the continued growth in the size and
complexity of our securities markets, and the absolute certainty that
persons seeking to perpetuate financial fraud will always be among
us, private actions will continue to be essential to the maintenance
of investor protection
The general support of securities regulators for the right of
the plaintiffs' bar to seek enforcement of the securities laws is
not surprising.' After all, the goal of securities plaintiffs' attor-
' Testimony of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement,
Securities and Exchange Commnission, Concerning Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws Before the Subcomm. on Sccurities, Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs (on file with Brooklyn Law Review). The same con-
clusions have been expressed by the state securities regulators, as reflected in the
statement of a representative of the National Association of Securities Administra-
tors Association ("NASAA"):
NASAA believes it would be unwise, in the name of 'reform," to further
restrict the ability of defrauded investors to be made whole. Private
rights of action under the securities laws are essential to dater prospec-
tive wrongdoers, compensate the victims of fraud, and maintain public
confidence in the marketplace. No one-save those who have committed
or assisted the fraud in the first place-benefits from a wholesale assault
on private rights of action.
Testimony August 10, 1994 Mark Griffin, Director, Division of Securities Utah Dep't
of Commerce House EnergylTelecommunications and Finance Securities Litigation,
Fed. Document Clearinghouse Cong. Testimony, Aug. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter 'Griffin Testimony']. Similar sentiments
were expressed by former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden testifying in 1991
before the Senate Banking Committee, when he said that "b]ecause the
Commission does not have adequate resources to detect and prosecute all
violations of the federal securities laws, private actions perform a critical role in
preserving the integrity of our securities markets." Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Cong. Rep. No. 104-98, 104th Cong., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 9I 85,629, 86,777 (June 19, 1995) [hereinafter "Report No. 104-98].
' While the regulators generally oppose substantial limits on plaintiffs' actions,
the SEC has expressed some concern about unnecessary shareholder litigation. In
a speech to the Securities Regulation Institute in early 1994, SEC Chairman Ar-
thur Levitt, for example, suggested that the SEC intervene in cases which it
thought were frivolous and stated, "I am especially interested in ways to give
shareholders greater control over their own litigation and curb potential conflicts of
interest between class-action lawyers and the shareholders they represent" Christi
Harlan, SECs Levitt Talks of Active Attempts to Curb Litigation, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 1994, at B7. See Arthur Levitt, Between Caveat Emptor and Caucat Ven-
1995]
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neys is to recover damages on behalf of investors for violations
of the securities laws, a goal entirely consistent with the aims
of the regulators. It is for this reason that courts acknowledge
the legitimate role of plaintiffs acting as "private attorneys
general" to enforce the securities laws.9 The public and private
sectors work together to deter misconduct and to obtain relief
for aggrieved investors.
What conduct violates section 10(b), however, remains a
question of some controversy, as does the means by which an
appropriate section 10(b) cause of action can be pled. Indeed,
the corporate world, led by large accounting firms which per-
ceive themselves as being the prime targets of securities litiga-
tions, may soon succeed in pushing through revisions in the
Act which could have the effect of severely limiting plaintiffs'
suits, and make much of the current law moot. In response to
aggressive lobbying by business groups," and fresh from their
dor: The Middle Ground of Litigation Reform, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Securi-
ties Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (Jan. 25, 1994). These statements,
of course, were made well before the November 1994 elections and the substantial
reforms proposed by the Republican Congress, reforms that go far beyond anything
the SEC has ever suggested were necessary.
More recently, Levitt has reaffirmed his belief in the need for private securi-
ties actions, stating:
Besides serving as the primary vehicle for compensating defrauded inves-
tors, private actions also provide a "necessary supplement" to the
Commission's own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities
law violations. Private actions are crucial to the integrity of our disclo-
sure system because they provide a direct incentive for issuers and other
market participants to meet their obligations under the securities laws.
Testimony of Arthur Levitt before the Senate Securities Subcommittee, Nov. 10,
1993, quoted in Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,777.
' See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310
(1985) (private sector actions are a "necessary supplement" to the SEC's enforce-
ment regime) (citation omitted).
10 Federal Election Commission data compiled by Citizen Action, an activist
consumer organization, reveals that groups lobbying for reform of the tort and
securities laws donated $23 million to federal candidates for the 1994-1995 elec-
tions, with the Big Six accounting firms contributing $3.6 million of that total. In
contrast, trial lawyers representing the plaintiffs' bar contributed less than $2
million during the same time period. Reversal of Fortunes: Big Business Wins a
Battle with Trial Lawyers, but the War Isn't Over, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 20, 1995, at 30. More recently, the Wall Street Journal reported that six
congressmen with oversight of key committees covering securities regulation re-
ceived a total of more than $5.5 million in contributions from financial services
firms. Securities Firms Make Large Gifts to Congressmen, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
1995, at C1.
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dominating victory in the November 1994 elections, the Repub-
licans in Washington have recently-and precipitously-passed
legislation designed to limit plaintiffs' lawsuits," a goal that
had been incorporated into the Republicans' highly publicized
"Contract with America." As passed by the House, the amend-
ments to the Act include a number of provisions which threat-
en the efficacy of existing laws, such as a modified 'loser pay"
rule pursuant to which a court may award a defendant
attorneys' fees if it determines, following dismissal, that an
action "was not substantially justified."' While rejecting such
a stringent loser pay provision, the Senate version would re-
quire courts to make specific findings upon adjudication of a
matter as to whether parties and their counsel complied with
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and to
' The Securities Litigation Reform Act, HR. 1058, 104th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1995) (passed on March 8, 1995 by a vote of 325-99) [hereinafter 'HR. 1058'1;
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995)
(passed on June 28, 1995 by a vote of 69-30) [hereinafter "S. 2401]. The House
and Senate leadership must now meet in conference to resolve the differences be-
tween the bills and submit a formal product to the President for signature.
I HR 1058, supra note 11, § 3(c)(1). The House bill also includes a number of
other measures designed to limit what are perceived to be frivolous litigations,
such as: (i) requiring explicit pleading of scienter, including "specific allegations
which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the
time the alleged violation occurred"; (ii) requiring that any allegedly fraudulent
statement be made "knowingly or recklessly," with recklessness defined to be "an
extreme departure from standards of ordinary care"; (iii) staying discovery during
the pendency of a motion to dismiss; (iv) requiring a class action steering com-
mittee to be established to oversee class action securities litigation; (v) eliminating
bonus payments to named plaintiffs in such actions; (vi) prohibiting a nand
plaintiff from serving as a class representative in more than five class actions
during any three-year period, (vii) requiring plaintiffs to obtain an undertaking in
an amount the court determines to be 'just and equitable" towards the possible
payment of attorneys fees; (viii) prohibiting brokers or dealers from soliciting or
accepting payment for assisting attorneys in locating plaintiffs for class actions;
and (ix) removing joint and several liability for defendants found liable only for
reckless conduct.
" Rule 11(b) specifies that, by submitting pleadings or other matters to the
courts, an attorney is certifying that, to the best of his or her knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, such submissions are not being presented 'for any improper pur-
pose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation," that any legal contentions "are warranted by existing law or by
a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of eisting law
or the establishment of new law," and that any factual allegations "have evidentia-
ry support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery." FED. R.
Crv. P. 11(b).
1995]
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impose sanctions if they did not.14 These provisions are not
only unnecessary, since the courts already have a means under
the existing Rule 11 to sanction frivolous pleadings by either
plaintiffs or defendants, but they are clearly designed for only
one purpose-to have an in terrorem effect on plaintiffs by
discouraging the filing of litigation. The effect will be to dis-
courage not only so-called frivolous litigation, but also merit-
worthy cases that plaintiffs' attorneys, who are paid only on a
contingency, will not be willing to file due to the added risk
imposed by the legislation.
Moreover, both the House and Senate bills would codify a
"safe harbor" for "forward-looking statements" pursuant to
which projections, estimates or descriptions of future events
would be immune from serving as the basis for litigation so
long as the party making such projections specifies that they
may not be realized.15 Thus, a company could escape liability
for projections or other "forward-looking statements," even if it
knew those projections were unreasonable when made and
insiders earned windfalls through sales of inflated stock prices
as a result. Indeed, unless a plaintiff could prove that a defen-
dant deliberately intended to mislead investors, as opposed to
mislead customers or competitors, or that the plaintiff lied for
some other purpose, an intentionally false statement about a
future event would not be subject to the securities laws.16 Al-
14 Among other things, S. 240 would require plaintiffs in a securities class
action to publish notice of the action to solicit class representatives. It specifies
that, in selecting the class representative, a court would presume that the "most
adequate plaintiff is a member of the class "with the largest financial stake" in
the litigation. Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,761. The bill would also
require courts to stay discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss, id. at
86,764, 86,771; specify pleading standards under Section 10(b) pursuant to which
plaintiffs must specifically identify each misleading statement and the reasons why
it is misleading and must specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind, id. at 86,764, 86,771;
provide that joint and several liability shall only apply to "knowing-and not
reckless-securities fraud, id. at 86,769, 86,773; and prohibit fees to brokers for
providing plaintiffs and bonuses to named plaintiffs for serving as class represen.
tatives, id. at 86,770.
16 See H.R. 1058, supra note 11, § 5 (establishment of "safe harbor" for pre-
dictive statements); S. 240, supra note 11, § 105 (safe harbor for forward-looking
statements).
16 The sole limitation to this broad immunity, provided in the Senate bill but
not the House version, would provide liability only if plaintiffs could prove that
such statements were "knowingly made with the expectation, purpose, and actual
[Vol. 61: 593
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though the new legislation has been strongly criticized by secu-
rities regulators and Democratic officials," and has become
subject to increasingly scathing attacks in the press, 8 it now
intent of misleading investors." S. 240, supra note 11, § 105(c)(1). As explained in
the Senate Report on the bill, "expectation," "purpose" and "actual intent" are
considered to be "independent elements of the exclusion [from the immunity
clause], and plaintiifs have the burden of pleading and proving each of these ele-
ments." Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,766. Chairman Levitt has ex-
pressed opposition to these safe harbor provisions, even with the exception provid-
ed under the Senate bill. In a May 25, 1995 letter to the Senate, he expressed his
"serious concerns about the safe harbor fraud exclusion as it relates to the strin-
gent standard of proof that must be satisfied before a private plaintiff can pre-
vail," and warned that the standard of 'kmowingly made with the expectation,
purpose and actual intent of misleading investors" was more stringent than that
currently used by the SEC and the courts. Report No. 104-98, cupra note 7, at
86,780-86,781 (quoting Levitt letter).
I7 Before the bill was submitted to the House for a vote, Attorney General
Janet Reno and White House Counsel Abner Mikva sent a letter on March 6,
1995 to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich warning that 'certain provisions of
H.R. 1058 are problematic, while others are manifestly unfair and could lead to
inadequate deterrence against financial fraud." House Amends- and Passes Legiala-
tion to Reform Private Securities Litigation, SEC. REG. & L. REP., Mar. 10, 1995,
at 392. Moreover, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has criticized the less extreme
Senate bill, finding that it does not strike 'the appropriate balance between curb-
ing abusive practices and protecting investors.7 Litigation Reform Bill Criticized,
BLOOMBERG REPORT, June 5, 1995. In comments added to Senator Alfonse
D'Amate's report on S. 240, Senators Paul S. Sarbanes, Richard W. Bryan and
Barbra Boxer also expressed strong objections to many provisions in the Senate
bill, including the safe harbor provision which "will, for the first time, provide
immunity under the Federal securities laws for fraudulent statements," and the
proportionate liability provision which "will, for the first time, transfer responsibil-
ity from participants to a fraud to innocent victims of that fraud." Report No. 104-
98, supra note 7, at 86,776.
" See, e.g., Bill Could Harm Fraud Policing, A-P. NEWSVWPR, July 4, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File (quotes Professor Peter Navarro of the
University of California at Irvine as stating- "Mhe bill contains four provisions,
any one of them on its own is a significant deterrent to litigation. ... Taken
together, they essentially amount to a neutron bomb on private litigation."); Bills
Could Make Wall Street Fraud Harder to Deter, SEATTLE POST-IN'TELLIGENCER,
July 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File; Jeff Brown, Re-
form? What Reform?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 27, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, PHI File; Judy Fahys, Changes in Securities Laws May Harm In-
vestors, Says Utah's Top Regulator, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 1, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, SLTRIB File; Craig T. Ferris, Litigation Reform Can Only
Get Worse, THE BOND BUYER, July 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ASAPII File (recommends a veto of the bill, even if it followed "the more moder-
ate, but flawed, Senate version"); James D. Grisso, Public Investments Are at a
Risk, ROANOKE TIms & WORLD NEWS, Aug 2, 1995, available in LEXM, News
Library, ROANOK File ("In a direct threat to our financial markets, the US.
Congress is being extremely reckless by proposing drastic changes to federal laws
that protect us from financial scams"); Frank Lall, Congress Aims at Lazyers and
1995]
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appears quite likely that legislation which is extremely friend-
ly to industry will soon become law and thereby threaten the
power of Section 10(b) as a weapon for "the private attorney
general." It is therefore a particularly appropriate time to
examine carefully the current state of the law in order to de-
termine whether such "reforms" are necessary and to under-
stand their impact should they be implemented.
The Second Circuit has often interpreted Section 10(b).
One recent significant example is In re Time Warner Inc. Secu-
rities Litigation in which the Second Circuit noted the need for
courts to attempt to "balance" the interests of deterring fraud
and discouraging frivolous lawsuits.19 This Article examines
the Second Circuit's attempts to provide that balance through
its interpretation of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2" In so doing, this Article also considers the need
for the "reforms" reflected in the recently passed legislation.
This Article first describes how courts have used Rule 9(b)
to discourage frivolous litigation by requiring particularity in
the pleading of securities fraud. Next, this Article argues that
through Rule 9(b) the system provides an effective means for
Ends Up Shooting Small Investors in the Back, MONEY, Sept. 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, TIME File (the legislation would "[a]llow executives to de-
liberately lie about their firm's prospects"); Less Protection for Investors, CONSUMER
REP., Sept., 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CONSMR File (the proposed
legislation "giv[es] corporations broad protections that are likely to free them from
fear of meritorious investor lawsuits as well as curbing 'frivolous' litigation"); Gone
Marlowe, Securities Fraud Victims Out of Luck?, TAMPA TRIB., Aug 6, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, TAMTRB File; More Help For Financial Giants,
ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ATLJNL File;
New Security Investment 'Reform' by Congress, May Be Swindlers Protection Act,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CINNQR
File; Robert Reno, GOP Betrays Constituents By Helping the Swindlers, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File; Safe
Harbors for Financial Fraud, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BALSUN File; Ben Stein, License to Conceal, NEW YORK,
Aug 21, 1995, at 22 ("In 1995, in conjunction with the Republican-dominated Con-
gress, the entity most harmful to the legal rights of ordinary Americans . . . was
the Big Six national accounting firms."); Stock Fraud Redefined, WASH. POST, July
6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (states that House bill,
"swept through in great haste last winter, contains a number of exaggerations that
would create real trouble," and notes that the Senate bill "also has substantial
defects"); Toothless Watchdog Can't Stop Investment Fraud, USA TODAY, July 31,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File.
" 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1397 (1994).
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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deterring so-called "strike suits"-actions which are "begun
'with the hope of winning large attorney's fees or private set-
tlements, and with no intention of benefiting the corporation
[or class] on behalf of which suit is theoretically brought."''
This Article then analyzes how Rule 9(b) was applied in Time
Warner, considering the extent to which the court found the
proper balance between deterring fraud and discouraging frivo-
lous litigation. Based on this analysis, this Article concludes
that the system is now overly aggressive in dealing with the
potential for frivolous litigation. The holding of Time Warner
goes too far: by reaffirming the Second Circuit's imposition of
an unnecessary obligation on plaintiffs to plead scienter with
some form of specificity, the court has imposed a requirement
that is neither necessary nor logical. Finally, this Article evalu-
ates the debate that has erupted over the purported need to
"reform" the law of securities fraud to "protect7 corporate
America from what is perceived to be needless litigation. Upon
closer examination of the arguments for reform, it appears that
there is little empirical evidence to support substantial revi-
sions of the status quo. This Article therefore concludes that
its recommendations with respect to the pleading standards for
scienter provide a principled approach to securities law with-
out creating an unnecessary risk of meritless lawsuits.
I. THE ROLE OF RULE 9(B) IN DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS
LITIGATION
A. The "Tension Between Two Powerful Interests"
In Time Warner, the Second Circuit noted that any inter-
pretation of Section 10(b) involves an "inevitable tension be-
tween two powerful interests." In describing these "inter-
ests," the court stated:
On the one hand, there is the interest in deterring fraud in the
securities markets and remedying it when it occurs. That interest is
served by recognizing that the victims of fraud often are unable to
detail their allegations until they have had some opportunity to con-
duct discovery of those reasonably suspected of having perpetrated a
21 Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620, 623-24 (3d Cir. 1967).
2 Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 263.
1995]
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fraud. Consistent with that interest, modern pleading rules usually
permit a complaint to survive dismissal unless, in the familiar
phrase, "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
On the other hand, there is the interest in deterring the use of
the litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settle-
ments as the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that
frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, even though
no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to completion.23
The court then went on to lament the difficulties inherent
in the effort to balance "these competing interests," stating
that "[it has never been clear how [they] ... are to be accom-
modated, and the adjudication process is not well suited to the
formulation of a universal resolution of the tensions between
them."'24 The court concluded that: "[i]n the absence of a more
refined statutory standard than the vague contours of section
10(b) or a more detailed attempt at rule-making than the SEC
has managed in Rule 10b-5, despite 50 years of unavailed
opportunity, courts must adjudicate the precise cases before
them, striking the balance as best they can.'" In effect, the
court was chiding the legislature for abdicating its responsibili-
ty to more carefully define the securities laws for the judicia-
ry,26 a challenge the Republican-controlled Congress has been
more than happy to accept.
By emphasizing the competing goals of deterring both
fraud and frivolous lawsuits, while proclaiming the inability of
Id. at 263 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
24 Id.
Id. at 264.
2' For example, the court stated:
In [striking the balance as best we can], we do well to recognize several
consequences of this common law approach to what is supposed to be a
statutory standard. First, our outcomes will not necessarily evolve a dis-
cernible pattern. Second, the absence of a clear pattern will inevitably
create uncertainty in the fields of both securities and litigation. Third,
however sensibly we strike the balance in a particular case, we will not
avoid the risks of adverse consequences: in the aftermath of any ruling
that upholds the dismissal of a 10b-5 suit, there will be some opportu-
nity for unremedied fraud; in the aftermath of any ruling that permits a
10b-5 suit to progress beyond a motion to dismiss, there will be some
opportunity to extract an undeserved settlement. Unattractive as those
prospects are, they neither indicate a sound basis for decision nor permit
avoidance of decision.
[Vol. 61: 593
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the judicial system to strike an appropriate balance, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Time Warner assumes two propositions
that-although accepted by many in the current debate over
securities reform-are not necessarily accurate: first, that the
courts have not already succeeded in structuring a system that
provides the necessary balance; and second, that the concern
over "frivolous" lawsuits is significant enough to be considered
equal to the need to deter fraud. Notwithstanding the court's
apparent dismay over its own limitations, an examination of
the section 10(b) caselaw indicates that the judiciary has been
quite successful in developing a system that effectively deters
frivolous litigation while providing a means for combatting
corporate fraud. Whether that success can continue under the
proposed reforms is the critical question.
B. Implementation Of Rule 9(b)
The Supreme Court concluded over twenty years ago, in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,' that, in interpret-
ing section 10(b), courts should be cognizant of the impact on
the potential for frivolous litigation. In that case, the Court
held that only purchasers or sellers of securities-as opposed
to those who were discouraged from purchasing or selling-had
standing under the securities laws.' This decision was based,
in part, on consideration of the effect of broadening the class of
potential plaintiffs able to bring suit under the securities
laws.' Noting that there had been "widespread recognition
2 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
23 Id. at 754-55.
=' To justify its consideration of "policy" concerns, the Court cited Title II of
the 1934 Act, which amended § 11 of the 1933 Act to provide that "[i(n any suit
under this or any other section of this title the court may, in its discretion, re-
quire an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including rea-on-
able attorney's fees" 421 U.S. at 740 (quoting § 206(d), 48 Stat. 881, 903). In in-
troducing this amendment on the Senate floor, Senator Duncan Fletcher, then
chairman of the Senate Banling & Finance Committee, had stated that it was
designed, among other things, to provide "a defense against blackmail suits." Id. at
741 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 8669). The Court then concluded.
Where Congress in those sections of the 1933 Act which expressly con-
ferred a private cause of action for damages, adopted a provision uni-
formly regarded as designed to deter 'strike" or nuisance actions, that
fact alone justifies our consideration of such potential in determining the
limits of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in an action wholly implied
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that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexa-
tiousness different in degree and in kind from that which ac-
companies litigation in general,"0 the Court explained:
[I]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of infor-
mation even a complaint which by objective standards may have
very little chance of success at trial has a settlement value to the
plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so
long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by
dismissal or summary judgment."
Today, the Supreme Court maintains the same concern. In
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, for
example, the Court held that aiding and abetting liability
could not be implied under Section 10(b), citing Blue Chip's
concern for the "danger of vexatiousness" in securities law-
suits, where "[1]itigation under 10b-5 ... requires secondary
actors to expend large sums even for pretrial defense and the
negotiation of settlement."32 Thus, the need to ensure that
corporations are not unnecessarily subjected to frivolous law-
suits has long been recognized by the courts. It is not as if
Congress is required to step in to halt an overly aggressive
judiciary that is continually expanding the reach of the securi-
ties laws. If anything, just the opposite is true.
The courts have always possessed, and have been more
than willing to use, the necessary tool to ensure that plaintiffs
are not free to allege securities fraud against corporations
without some reasonable basis. That tool is Rule 9(b), which
from the language in the 1934 Act.
Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
" Id. at 739 (referring to Judge Friendly's statement in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), that unduly expansive imposition of
civil liability "will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by inno.
cent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers").
" Id. at 740. The Court also stated that:
a plaintiff with a largely groundless [securities] claim [will be able] to
simply take up the time of a number of other people [through discovery],
with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of settle-
ment value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will
reveal relevant evidence.
Id. at 741.
114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). See also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083 (1991) ("to recognize liability on mere disbelief or undisclosed motive
without any demonstration that the proxy statement was false or misleading about
its subject . . . would threaten just the sort of strike suits and attrition by discov-
ery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage").
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specifies that "[in all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity."' The Second Circuit has previously recognized
that a primary purpose behind Rule 9(b) is discouraging frivo-
lous suits, stating-
The purpose of Rule 9(b) is three-fold-it is designed to provide a
defendant with fair notice of plaintiffs claim, to safeguard a
defendant's reputation from "improvident charges of wrongdoing,"
and to protect a defendant against the institution of a strike suit.
By using Rule 9(b) to ensure that every plaintiff alleges fraud
with particularity, and thus that the plaintiff has a reasonable
basis for bringing the action, courts can discourage the "strike
suits" that so many businesses and politicians seem to fear.
The existence of Rule 9(b) by itself, of course, does not
mean anything if it is not used, but the facts speak for them-
selves. Courts in the Second Circuit and throughout the coun-
try have used the rule aggressively to dismiss any case that
does not appear to have a valid basis. As the First Circuit put
it in Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, "[we have been es-
pecially rigorous in demanding such factual support in the
securities context to minimize the chance that a plaintiff with
a largely groundless claim will bring a suit and conduct exten-
sive discovery in the hopes of obtaining an increased
settlement.' 3
To satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), a complaint must
"(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were
fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
O'rien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.
1991) (citations omitted); see also Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir.
1978). Denny has frequently been cited in explaining the importance of Rule 9(b)
in discouraging groundless litigation. See, e.g., Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456,
1465 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1990); DiVittorio
v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1937); In re
Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (D. Del. 1982); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Del Valle, 528 F. Supp. 147, 149 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
26 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Sec also Kowal v. MCI
Communications Corp., Civ.A.No. 90-2862, 1992 WL 121378, at *7 (D.D.C. May 20,
1992), affd, 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Rule 9(b)... obligates the Court to
police such allegations with heightened scrutiny, in order to protect defendants
from harm to their reputation and goodwill and to reduce the number of strike
suits." (citing DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247
(2d Cir. 1987).
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the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements
were fraudulent."' In other words, plaintiffs must allege "the
who, what, when, where, and how" of the fraud.37 In applying
these requirements, courts have freely dismissed complaints
where the plaintiffs have failed to allege fraud with sufficient
particularity, by, for example, asserting "mere conclusory alle-
gations to the effect that defendant's conduct was fraudulent or
in violation of Rule 10b-5,"" or that the defendant
corporation's representations presented a "false, misleading,
and inflated picture of assets, earnings, and business" without
sufficient explanation as to how or why such representations
were false.39
Courts have been especially aggressive in dismissing cases
that merely plead "fraud by hindsight," i.e., that claim that
because a company's projections turned out to be wrong, they
"must have been" fraudulent.40 Thus, for example, complaints
" Acito v. Imcera Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Mills v.
Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Shields v.
Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Cosmas v.
Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989) (under Rule 9(b) a complaint must "ade-
quately specify the statements it claims were false or misleading, give particulars
as to the respect in which plaintiff contends the statements were fraudulent, state
when and where the statements were made, and identify those responsible for the
statements") (citing Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1985));
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1241 (2d ed. 1990) (to avoid dismissal, there "must be detailed ... averments
such as the time, the place, the identity of the parties involved, and the nature of
the fraud").
' DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
941 (1990); see also In re Abbott Lab. See. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (ND.
Ill. 1992).
' Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1971). See
also Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 1992);
Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989); Segal
v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972).
' Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1418-19 (7th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff "alleged no facts suggesting that the problems were significant enough to
jeopardize previously stated financial goals, and ... did not state with specificity
what the operational goals were"); Havsy v. Just Toys, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8077,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1994) (plaintiffs could not demon.
strate that the defendants "knew or should have known [the alleged misrepresen-
tations] to be false at the time they were made") (citing Schwartz v. Novo
Industri, A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
" Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the
defendants' failure to foresee New York City's financial collapse was merely "fraud
by hindsight" and thus did not constitute a fraud under the securities laws);
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that allege that "substantial increases in loan loss reserves
provide factual support for a claim that earlier statements of
adequate reserves were fraudulent... have not survived scru-
tiny under Rule 9(b),"' nor have cases which fail "to show
that defendants' opinions and projections were issued 'without
reasonable genuine belief."' 2 As explained by the Seventh
Circuit:
The story in this complaint is familiar in securities litigation. At one
time the firm bathes itself in a favorable light. Later the firm dis-
closes that things are less than rosy. The plaintiff contends that the
difference must be attributed to fraud. 'lust be' is the critical
phrase, for the complaint offers no information other than the differ-
ences between the two statements of the firm's condition. Because
only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflect fraud, plaintiffs
may not proffer the different financial statements and rest. Inves-
tors must point to some facts suggesting that the difference is attrib-
utable to fraud. Rule 9(b) required the district court to dismiss the
complaint, which discloses none of the circumstances that might
separate fraud from the benefit of hindsight.43
Thus, concern that plaintiffs can "extort" settlements by bring-
ing suit every time a stock price falls because of disappointing
results is unwarranted. Courts will not allow such conclusory
allegations of fraud by hindsight to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
Similarly, courts have refused to find defendants liable for
projections or estimates that, although ultimately proven to be
Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1993) (unhappy investors may not
simply proffer the fact that the defendant company's financial results differed from
the earlier-offered projections (as described in In re Healthcare Compare Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 93C 1970, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1733, at *5 (NJ). Ill. Feb. 13, 1995));
Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 880 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Mas3.
1995) ("The mere allegation of later substantial increases in loan loss reserves
does not provide adequate factual support for a claim that earlier statements of
adequate reserves may be attributable to fraud or misrepresntation.... There
is no 'fraud by hindsight." (citing Denny, 576 F.2d at 470)).
"Lindner Dividend Fund, 880 F. Supp. at 58 (citing Drscoll v. Landmark
Bank for Sav., 758 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1991) ('Plaintiffs allegations of
[defendant's] insufficient loan loss reserves ... are all so conclusory in nature
that they could easily apply to any bank in New England.); Vachon v. BayBanks,
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 79, 80-82 (D. Mass. 1991) (first quarter loss and doubling of
reserves did not indicate that earlier statements were the result of fraud).
"Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
Herskowitz v. NutriSystem, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988)).
" DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 941 (1990).
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incorrect, were "tempered by warnings of risk," pursuant to the
so-called "bespeaks caution doctrine.' 4 As one district court
recently explained "[tihe bespeaks caution doctrine... pro-
vides that where the totality of statements is generally cau-
tious, and projections are tempered by warnings of risks, those
statements are not actionable."' Both through refusing to
recognize fraud by hindsight and by implementing the be-
speaks caution doctrine, courts have effectively enforced the
safe harbor that the SEC has created for good faith forecasts.
Pursuant to this safe harbor, the SEC has declared that a
forward-looking statement "shall be deemed not to be a fraudu-
lent statement ... unless it is shown that such statement was
made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed
other than in good faith."'
From an empirical basis, there is no question that courts
have frequently used Rule 9(b) to dismiss securities actions.
And with the large number of Reagan appointees dominating
the federal judiciary,47 as well as the increasing public disdain
Havsy v. Just Toys, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8077, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1994).
' Id. at *10; see also Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st
Cir. 1991); Meyer Pincus & Assoc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.
1991); In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Sinay v.
Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch,
949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407
(9th Cir. 1994); Sable v. Southmark Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Hayden v. Feldman, 753 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
"' SEC Rule 175(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1994). See Krim v. BancTexas
Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993) (Rule 175 protects companies
from liability for forward-looking statements "even if in hindsight [they are] shown
to have been incorrect, as long [as they were] made or reaffirmed with a reason-
able basis in fact and in good faith."); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16
F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (complaint "failed to set forth sufficient facts
to suggest that [the defendant's] optimistic statements and earnings projections
lacked a reasonable basis").
While the SEC rule and the judicially-created "bespeaks caution" doctrine still
require companies to have a reasonable basis for their projections, the new legisla-
tion passed by the House would remove that requirement, effectively immunizing
companies from liability for all forward-looking statements, regardless of whether
there was a reasonable basis for them. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
'4 During Reagan's eight years in office, he appointed three members to the
Supreme Court, 89 of the then 168 circuit court judges (51%) and 291 of the then
575 district court judges (51%). Summing Up Reagan's Impact on the United
States, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 15, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
AP File. In describing the impact of Reagan on the United States, a representa-
tive of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation stated that "a more conser-
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for lawyers and litigation in general, this trend is not likely to
stop. A report of the Big Six accounting firms, for example,
concluded that, between 1990 and 1992, more than thirty-three
percent of the securities law cases filed against them were dis-
missed,48 while the Securities Industry Association has report-
ed that in 1992 forty-six motions to dismiss were filed, of
which twenty-nine, or sixty-three percent, were successful."
Although proponents of further limiting securities actions may
protest either that plaintiffs can merely refile complaints after
initially being dismissed (which, of course, the court can then
dismiss again if they are inadequate) or that the number of
dismissals demonstrates the number of meritless suits that
have been filed,'e this nevertheless demonstrates that courts
are taking an active role in policing litigation to ensure that
suits without reasonable claims are weeded out.
Given a conservative federal bench that is active in dis-
missing cases that do not satisfy ever-more strict pleading
requirements, there appears to be no real need to reform the
laws to further restrict access to the courts. The current effort
vative federal judiciary is 'one of his more enduring legacies,' while a representa-
tive of the liberal Alliance for Justice stated that Reagan's 'appointees generally
have been white, pro-business, with little respect for individual rights." Id. See
also Marcia Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, NAT'L L.J., April 18, 1988,
available in LEXIS, News Library, NTLAWJ File ('Mey are predominantly white,
male and wealthy-the embodiment of conservative expectations. And though their
impact is only beginning to be seen, Reagan judges are transforming the federal
judiciary in ways that will be felt for years to come."). Reagan and Bush together
appointed over 62% of the total federal judges in the country (484 of the 777
occupied seats as of January 1995). Clinton Judge Picks Praised, AP ONLINE, Jan.
19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File. There is little doubt that
these conservative appointments have had-and will continue to have--a signifi-
cant effect on the interpretation of the federal securities laws.
I Priate Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Af-
fairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1993), at 734 [hereinafter "Sen. Hearing'] (letter
to Senate Securities Subcommittee from Mayer, Brown & Platt, Sept. 24, 1993),
cited in Joel Seligman, Commentary: The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV.
438, 457 n.34 (1994). The report stated that the Big Six accounting firms had
been sued 129 times and had succeeded in dismissing 43 cazes.
"Sen. Hearings, supra note 48, at 549 (letter from Marc E. Laclkitz, Presi-
dent, Securities Industry Association).
' Of course, a strong argument can be made that just becauze a case is dis-
missed does not mean that the case was without merit. It may merely mean that
proof of the fraud was within the hands of the defendants, preventing the plaintiff
from pleading a valid fraud case with sufficient particularity to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b).
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to reform the securities laws is primarily a result of potential
defendant corporations taking advantage of a trend towards
conservatism. Their motivation may have more to do with the
inconvenience of complying with the securities laws than any
real concern over the adverse impacts of having to respond to
truly frivolous litigation. As this discussion demonstrates, rule
9(b) provides a potent tool which the courts freely use to en-
sure that plaintiffs are unable to pursue actions which do not
have a reasonable basis. This is exemplified by the manner in
which the Second Circuit applied the rule in Time Warner,
substantially limiting the plaintiffs' cause of action. As argued
below, however, the court's application of existing law also
reveals some of the weaknesses of the current pleading stan-
dards.
II. APPLICATION OF RuLE 9(B) IN TIME WARNER
In Time Warner, the company was sued for misrepresent-
ing the potential success of its campaign to locate international
"strategic partners" who could provide a necessary infusion of
capital to offset the substantial debt incurred in the acquisition
of Warner Communications, Inc. by Time Inc. in 1989. Plain-
tiffs alleged that, while failing to disclose that this search was
likely to be unsuccessful, Time Warner was instead contem-
plating a new stock offering as an alternative method for rais-
ing capital.5 When the stock offering was announced, it led to
a substantial decline in the price of Time Warner stock, based
at least in part on the fact that the stock offering would result
in a dilution of the rights of the existing shareholders.52
A. The Alleged Misrepresentations and Omissions
After the case was dismissed by the district court, it was
appealed to the Second Circuit, which considered three issues:
(1) whether a corporation has a duty to update somewhat optimistic
predictions about achieving a business plan when it appears that
the plan might not be realized, (2) whether a corporation has a duty
to disclose a specific alternative to an announced business plan
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 262.
62 Id.
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when that alternative is under active consideration, and (3) whether
a corporation is responsible for statements in newspapers and secu-
rity analyst reports that are attributed to unnamed corporate per-
sonnel! 3
Taking the last issue first, the court held that
unattributed statements reported by the press and analysts,
some of which admittedly would "bolster plaintiffs' case consid-
erably,"' were insufficient to satisfy the particularity re-
quirement of Rule 9(b), concluding that Rule 9(b) requires, "at
a minimum, that the plaintiff identify the speaker of the alleg-
edly fraudulent statements."' In reaching this decision, the
court noted that "[jiust as 10b-5 litigation, however resolved,
risks adverse consequences," such as an unremedied fraud, "a
strict application of Rule 9(b) in the context of unattributed
statements also risks unfortunate effects," including the possi-
bility that "[a] scheming corporation could inflate its stock
price through fraudulent statements whispered to reporters or
analysts."8 The court concluded, however, that "this is not a
sufficiently likely scenario to justify a rule that would permit a
suit alleging unattributed statements to survive a motion to
dismiss," given that "[flew reporters or analysts would know-
ingly abet a fraud, and many will detect and reveal a
corporation's efforts to use them as a channel for fraudulent
statements," and that "investors tend to discount information
in newspaper articles and analyst reports when the author is
unable to cite specific, attributable information from the com-
Id. at 261.
4d. at 264.
Id. at 265. The court distinguished various cases that permitted claims based
on statements attributed to corporate "spokesperson? or otherwise instigated by
the company, pointing out that they involved official press releases or offering
statements, see DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d
Cir. 1987) and In re Ann-Taylor Stores See. Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 1004
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); statements by named individuals to analysts or reporters, see
Cytryn v. Cook, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 95,409 (N.. Cal. July 2, 1990) and In
re Columbia Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 237, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); and cases involving
the defendant's placing its "imprimatur" on analysts' reports, rce Elkind v. IUggett
& Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980) and Alfus v. Pyramid Tech-
nology Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 603 (NJ). Cal. 191). According to the court in
Time Warner, "In]one of these cases sanctions the pleading of fraud through com-
pletely unattributed statements, even when the plaintiff alleges on information and
belief that the unattributed statement was made by an agent of the defendant."
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 265.
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 265.
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pany."57
With respect to whether Time Warner had made affirma-
tive misrepresentations concerning the likelihood that its effort
to find strategic partners would succeed, the court sustained
the district court's finding that the statements were not action-
able. Noting that the statements in question merely involved
Time Warner's representations that "talks were ongoing" and
that the company "hopes the talks will be successful," the court
concluded that "[there is no suggestion that the factual asser-
tions contained in any of these statements were false when the
statements were made.""8 Thus, while defendants may have
made optimistic statements concerning their intentions with
respect to strategic partners, there was nothing to indicate
that, at the time the statements were made, the defendants
did not have a reasonable basis for holding such beliefs.
The court also reviewed two types of nondisclosures in
Time Warner. Noting that "a duty to update opinions and pro-
jections may arise if the original opinions or projections have
become misleading as a result of intervening events," 9 the
court held that the statements regarding the potential success
of the search for strategic partners "lack[ed] the sort of definite
positive projections that might require later correction," add-
ing:
The statements suggested only the hope of any company, embarking
on talks with multiple partners, that the talks would go well. No
identified defendant stated that he thought deals would be struck by
a certain date, or even that it was likely that deals would be struck
at all.... These statements did not become materially misleading
when the talks did not proceed well."
Although it dismissed these allegations of failure to up-
67 Id.
Id. at 266.
" The recently passed House bill would remove any question about this duty,
as it provides that "[iun any private action arising under this title, no person shall
be deemed to have any obligation to update a forward-looking statement made by
such person unless such person has expressly and substantially contemporaneously
undertaken to update such statement." HJR. 1058, supra note 11, § 5(c).
" Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267. The court contrasted the situation in Time
Warner to that in In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F.2d 1109,
1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990), where the Chairman of
the Board had stated, among other things, that a new computer product would be
"phenomenally successful the first year out of the chute."
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date, the court went on to find that a valid claim had been
made against Time Warner for its failure to disclose that stra-
tegic alliances were not the only option it was pursuing. The
company should have acknowledged that it was also contem-
plating a new stock offering to raise the necessary capital. In
contrast to the optimistic references to ongoing negotiations,
which the court found to be an inadequate basis for reliance by
investors, the court held that it was reasonable for the investor
to have relied on the representation that the company was
pursuing only one strategy, particularly where the pursuit of a
second strategy could have substantially different effects on
the company's shareholders.6
In explaining its decision, the court stated that while an
omission is only actionable when there is "a duty to disclose
the omitted facts," such a duty can arise "from the combination
of a prior statement and a subsequent event, which, if not
disclosed, renders the prior statement false or misleading,"
thereby causing the inquiries as to duty and materiality to "co-
alesce." " Citing to the Supreme Court's conclusion that undis-
closed information is material if there is "a substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the 'total mix! of information available," the Second Cir-
cuit found that "[ilf a reasonable investor would so regard the
omitted fact, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where the
prior statement would not be rendered misleading in the ab-
sence of the disclosure.'c
With respect to the omitted fact in Time Warner, the court
concluded:
A duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior
public statements materially misleading, not merely when that in-
"' Explaining the different effects of the two strategies, the court stated:
A successful strategic alliance, simultaneously opening strategic markets
and reducing debt, would have improved the corporations expected profit
stream and should have served to drive up the share price. An offering
of new shares, in contrast, would dilute the ownership rights of existing
shareholders, likely decrease dividends, and drive down the price of the
stock.
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267.
62 Id.
I Id. at 268 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 US. 438, 449
(1976)).
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formation completely negates the public statement. Time Warner's
public statements could have been understood by reasonable inves-
tors to mean that the company hoped to solve the entire debt prob-
lem through strategic alliances. Having publicly hyped strategic
alliances, Time Warner may have come under a duty to disclose
facts that would place the statements concerning strategic alliances
in a materially different light."
It then went on to stress that it was not requiring a corpora-
tion to disclose every fact in its possession that might affect
the price of its stock whenever it spoke, but rather that "When
a corporation is pursuing a specific business goal and announc-
es that goal as well as an intended approach for reaching it, it
may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to
reaching the goal when those approaches are under active and
serious consideration."85
Although the court permitted the plaintiffs' claim to sur-
vive, by upholding a cause of action based on Time Warner's
failure to disclose the intended stock offering, the decision
nevertheless eliminated most of the plaintiffs' allegations and
substantially reduced the class period. The plaintiffs had ini-
tially filed suit on behalf of a putative class of all stockholders
who had acquired Time Warner stock between December 12,
1990, when the company first began announcing its plan to
seek strategic partners as a means for dealing with its sub-
stantial debt, and June 7, 1991, when it announced the stock
offering and the price fell. But by limiting the action solely to
the undisclosed offering, the court reinstated claims only for
the nondisclosure of the rights offering between May 1, 1991
and June 6, 1991, cutting what had been a six-month class
period down to slightly more than one month.66 As a result, it
can hardly be considered a pro-plaintiff decision. Nevertheless,
since it did permit at least some claims to survive, it has al-
ready been criticized as being too lenient toward the plain-
tiffs.' An analysis of the decision, however, does not support
that conclusion.
6Id.
"Id.
Id. at 271 n.8. The plaintiffs asserted that they could allege that the rights
offering was under consideration as early as November 1990. Id. at n.7. If so, they
might be able to submit an amended complaint and thereby gain back much of
the class period that they lost.
" See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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1. Unattributed Statements
In ruling as a matter of law that unattributed statements
cannot be raised as part of a claim under the securities laws,
the court was trying to strike a balance between deterring
fraud that might arise through such statements and discourag-
ing frivolous lawsuits based on such statements. In the context
of the case, however, its decision seems unnecessarily restric-
tive. If a company did in fact manipulate the market by leak-
ing false information to the press which reported it without
attribution, the company should nevertheless be held account-
able under the securities laws. The burden on the plaintiff
should be to identify sufficiently what information the defen-
dant disseminated to the press and to articulate a reasonable
basis for believing that information came from the defen-
dant.s In Time Warner, that burden seems to have been met
by the fact that the unattributed statements are entirely con-
sistent with statements admittedly disseminated to the market
by the company.
There was no dispute that Time Warner was making nu-
merous representations throughout the class period concerning
the existence of ongoing talks between the company and poten-
tial foreign investors about the possibility of entering into joint
ventures. Such representations were specifically quoted by the
court. 9 The unattributed statements, also quoted in detail in
the decision," parallel public statements by the company, dis-
cussing and highlighting the same issues. Therefore the plain-
tiff did not merely assume that the company was "whispering"
its fraudulent statements to the press in hopes of avoiding
attribution. To the contrary, the alleged facts suggest that the
The court's reasoning that the press or analysts would not vllingly abet a
fraud and would uncover it, Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 265, seems overly optimistic.
Reporters or analysts in whom a company confides are seeLing to beat their com-
petitors to the punch by disclosing previously unreported matters. Their cloze ties
to companies are therefore crucial to their success and, as such, they cannot be
viewed as entirely independent--certainly not as a replacement for strongly en-
forced securities laws. Similarly, the court's suggestion that investors will simply
"discount" unattributed information from a company, id., also seems too cavalier,
since the market often moves based on rumors and expectations about a
company's prospects.
Id. at 266 n.3.
70 Id. at 264 n.2.
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company was willingly and aggressively representing the sta-
tus of its discussions. Accordingly, it could easily be inferred by
a factfinder that the unattributed statements did indeed result
from communications by company representatives with the
media and analysts. In these circumstances, it was not unrea-
sonable to permit the unattributed statements to be at issue,
at least for purposes of discovery, assuming that the alleged
misstatements and omissions were sufficient to state a valid
cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 9(b). 1
There should be little concern that this interpretation of
Rule 9(b) requirements would lead to a rash of meritless suits.
To satisfy the rule there would have to be a reasonable basis
for attributing the statements to the defendant, such as here
where there was a demonstrable link between the unattributed
statements to those admittedly made by defendants. Moreover,
the statements taken as a whole would have to support a valid
claim. In fact, permitting the unattributed statements to be
considered in Time Warner would probably not have affected
the outcome in any event, since both the attributed and
unattributed statements related only to discussions of the
company's aspirations for strategic partners, the type of for-
ward-looking statements that the court had refused to accept
as a valid basis for litigation. 2 The court therefore unneces-
sarily limited possible claims arising from statements that, al-
though unattributed, could nevertheless reasonably be inferred
to have been made by a defendant corporation.
2. Affirmative Representations
In finding that the representations regarding the search
for strategic partners did not sustain a cause of action, the
court fairly applied the generally recognized rule that expres-
sions of opinion and projections are only actionable if plaintiffs
can allege sufficient facts "to support the inference that the
defendants either did not have these favorable opinions on
future prospects when they made the statements or that the
71 The court did not reach this latter issue in Time Warner since it held that
the unattributed statements were not actionable. Id. at 266.
72 Id. at 267.
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favorable opinions were without a basis in fact."73 After all, if
a party has a reasonable basis for making projections, he
should not be liable if those projections ultimately do not come
to pass. The conclusion to draw from the Second Circuit's ap-
plication of this rule in Time Warner is that courts are quite
capable of dismissing claims based on forward-looking state-
ments that do not properly allege fraud. Therefore, there is
little reason to legislate additional protections for defendants
who make such statements.74
The court also properly recognized the distinction between
the generally positive assertions regarding the strategic part-
ners, which were not actionable, and the deliberate omission of
the material fact that Time Warner was also considering a
stock offering-a valid basis for a cause of action. The court's
ruling with respect to the duty to update has become the
source of some controversy. The concern is that this rule might
deter companies from speaking at all because they will have to
be concerned about liability arising from future changes."
Here, however, the obligation placed on companies makes
sense. The optimistic representations concerning the search for
strategic partners were not definitive statements concerning
expected results, but merely optimism expressed about events
that any reasonable investor should realize might not come to
7 Id, at 266
' If the assumption made in the recently passed legislation is that a company
should not be liable for a forward-looldng statement even if it is made with abso-
lutely no basis, the rule articulated in Time Warner is insucient. See, e.g., supra
note 59 and accompanying text. It is hard to imagine a valid justification for im-
munity from liability in such circumstances. Yet that is effectively what the legis-
lation would provide.
' See, e.g., Carl W. Schneider, The Duty To Update: ime Requires A Reeval-
uation Of Basics, INSIGHTS 2 (April 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library,
INSITE File ("A significant tension exists, because an overly broad application of
the duty to update may be counterproductive to the goal of encouraging voluntary
prompt disclosure."); Gordon Jones 11, Comment, In re Time Warner, Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation: The Second Circuit Revisits Rule lOb-5-The Duties To Correct,
Update And Disclose Alternative Business Plans, 28 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1043 (1994)
('The Second Circuit may have acted too hastily in [Time Warner] and perhaps did
not fully consider the effect this ruling will have on corporations in the future.
The court's holding will require corporations to reveal various strategic alternatives
merely because they disclosed one possible approach. As the diztrict court warned,
corporations now face an 'excessive burden of either never to comment on their
plans or never to be free to evaluate alternate strategies without exposing most if
not all of their deliberations to public scrutiny.").
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pass. Thus, these representations created no valid claim under
the securities laws. In contrast, any company should recognize
that it is improper to publicize a particular strategy that has a
positive effect on stock prices while, at the same time, actively
pursuing an alternative strategy that could well have the oppo-
site effect on the market. In short, if you are going to speak, do
not do so in a way that is clearly misleading. The court here
simply held that plaintiffs had set forth a valid claim under
that rule. Although it is true that this ruling might deter some
forms of corporate speech, it is appropriate to do so if that
speech could be used to mislead.
B. Scienter
As an alternative basis for dismissing the complaint, the
district court also concluded that plaintiffs had failed to plead
scienter with sufficient particularity. The Second Circuit re-
versed this holding as well, finding that plaintiffs had met the
pleading standards.
While fraud must be pled with particularity under Rule
9(b), the rule expressly provides that "malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally."6 The relaxed pleading requirement for scienter is
predicated on the notion that "a plaintiff realistically cannot be
expected to plead a defendant's actual state of mind."7 De-
spite Rule 9(b)'s specification that intent, or scienter, can be
"averred generally," however, the Second Circuit has neverthe-
less imposed a stricter pleading requirement for scienter, re-
quiring a pleading to pass what has become known as the
"strong inference" test."8
7' FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
SConnecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980)).
7 S. 240 would codify this pleading standard, noted by Senator D'Amato as
being the "most stringent pleading standard" applied by the courts. Report No.
104-98, supra note 7, at 86,764 (citing Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268). The House
bill would go even further, requiring "specific allegations which, if true, would be
sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged viola-
tion occurred." H.R. 1058, supra note 11, § 4. The bill further provides that "[it
shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the mere presence of facts incon-
sistent with a statement or omission alleged to have been misleading." Id.
[Vol. 61: 593
DETERRING FRAUD
This test was first articulated in Ross v. Al. Robins Co.,
when the court held that "plaintiffs can be required to supply a
factual basis for their conclusory allegations regarding [a
defendant's] knowledge" of the alleged fraud. 9 The court con-
cluded that "it is reasonable to require that plaintiffs specifi-
cally plead those events that they assert give rise to a strong
inference that the defendants had knowledge of the facts con-
tained in... the complaint or recklessly disregarded their
existence." The Second Circuit has articulated two means by
which this standard can be satisfied. Plaintiffs can either "al-
lege facts establishing a motive to commit fraud and an oppor-
tunity to do so," or can "allege facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior." 1
In applying the strong inference test in Time Warner, the
court analyzed the potential motive and opportunity for defen-
dants to commit the alleged fraud. Dismissing the need to
focus on opportunity, given that "no one doubts that the defen-
dants had the opportunity, if they wished, to manipulate the
price of Time Warner stock,"2' the court focused its attention
on the defendants' motive. The court explained that it was a
close question "whether the defendants [were] adequately al-
leged to have had a motive to benefit from the nondisclosure
[of the stock offering], thereby satisfying the scienter require-
ment."
83
According to the plaintiffs, Time Warner had an incentive
not to disclose its consideration of the stock offering. By keep-
ing the planned offering secret, the company could keep the
price of the common stock artificially high and thereby lessen
79 607 F.2cl 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
Id. (emphasis added). A number of subsequent decisions by the Second Cir-
cuit, including Time Warner, have applied this requirement leading to the frequent
dismissal of cases for the failure to plead sufficient facts from which scienter can
be "strongly inferred." Id. at 268; see akso O'Brien v. National Property Analysts
Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991); Wexner v. First Manhattan Co, 902
F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13 (2cl Cir. 1989);
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Stem v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., Inc., 844 F.2d 997,
1004 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[C]ircumstances must be pleaded that provide a factual foun-
dation for otherwise conclusory allegations of scienter."); Connecticut Nat Bank,
808 F.2d at 962.
11 Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269 (citing Beck, 820 F.2d at 50).
2 Id. at 269.
" Id. at 270.
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the dilutive effect of the offering once it was implemented. In
response, the defendants argued that such a motive was "fa-
cially irrational," since any increase in the price would be lost
as soon as the offering was announced, thereby losing any
benefit that might have been achieved by not disclosing the
plan earlier.8 4 Explaining the motive theory of the case, the
court stated:
The unresolved issue is whether the effects of the alleged artificial
raising of the stock price by the combination of the glowing reports
of potential strategic alliances and the nondisclosure of the active
consideration of a rights offering could reasonably have been expect-
ed by the company not to have been completely dissipated by the
announcement of the rights offering, thereby enabling the company
to set the rights offering price somewhat higher than would have
been possible without the misleading statements and to lessen the
dilutive effect of the offering.8"
For the plaintiffs' theory to work, Time Warner had to hope
that the stock price inflation caused by its omission of material
facts would not be lost entirely once those facts were disclosed,
thereby permitting the company to raise more capital through
its offering with less stock.
The Second Circuit ultimately accepted the plaintiffs' ra-
tionale, finding that "a motive theory emerges with sufficient
reasonable possibilities to withstand a motion to dismiss."6 In
reaching this decision, the court noted the normal assumption
under the securities laws that an "efficient market" can ade-
quately absorb information released to the public, but distin-
guished the market's ability to correct for misrepresentations:
"however efficiently markets may be thought to work when
disclosures are proper, it is not beyond doubt that they may
not fully correct for prior misleading information." 7
After finding that plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient motive
to withstand a motion to dismiss, the court went on to hold
that this provided their only means for alleging scienter. There
4 Id. at 269
' Id. at 270.
" Id. at 270.
'" Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 270. The court went on to explain that "the issue is
not whether the misleading aspect of the prior statement in fact lingered; it is
only whether the plaintiffs can show that the defendants had a motive not to
promptly correct the misleading aspect of the prior statement." Id. at 270-71.
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was no "circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless behav-
ior," because "the complaint lacked allegations that could give
rise to a strong inference that Time Warner began to consider
the stock offering significantly before it was announced."'
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Winter argued that
the complaint should have been dismissed in its entirety. He
did so, however, based solely on his belief that plaintiffs did
not adequately allege scienter, as he agreed that Time Warner
had a duty to disclose the stock offering. With respect to the
duty to disclose, Judge Winter explained that the stock offering
at issue in the case was not a standard offering pursuant to
which the company merely offered more of its stock to the
public for sale. Rather, it was a "variable-price rights offering"
which was restricted to existing shareholders.'s By so restrict-
ing the offer, according to Judge Winter, Time Warner dis-
closed for the first time "that outside capital was not avail-
able," with "the only source of capital available for the debt
payments... the locked-in shareholders of Time Warner who
might lose all if the company defaulted on the debt." As a
result, Judge Winter concluded that Time Warner should have
disclosed its plans to conduct the offering:
[Tihe variable-price rights offering was dilutive but in a very differ-
ent sense from that indicated by my colleagues. If all shareholders
exercised their rights, each would purchase one new share for $105.
If only 60% exercised the rights, those shareholders would purchase
1-213 shares for $63. As alleged in the complaint, therefore, the
offering was coercive because shareholders hoping to minimize their
losses would feel compelled to come up with fresh money. Unlike an
infusion of capital from outside that would dilute but also benefit
shareholders, this new issue of equity would necessarily lessen the
value of the common shares because existing shareholders had ei-
ther to put up more money or to incur a disproportionate loss in
Id. at 271. The court, however, did note that plaintiffi might be able to
meet this standard as well if they could amend their complaint to allege sufficient
evidence that defendants had begun to consider the rights offering some time
before it was announced. Id.
'Id. at 273 (Winter, J., dissenting). Time Warner had first proposed the vari-
able-price rights offering to the SEC on June 6, 1991, but it was never consum-
mated because it was rejected by the SEC. The company subrequently obtained
approval for a second proposal, which it announced on July 12, 1991 It was the
June 6th announcement of the variable-price rights offering which led to the sub-
stantial decline in Time Warner's stock price. ltd. at 262, 273.
9' Id. at 273.
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value. In light of the prior statements, therefore, active consider-
ation of the variable-price option should have been disclosed ......
Although Judge Winter found that Time Warner was un-
der a duty to disclose consideration of the stock offering, he
nevertheless urged that the complaint be dismissed because
there was no motive for Time Warner not to have made timely
disclosure. He critiqued the majority's assumption that the
ultimate disclosure of the rights offering may not have com-
pletely offset the artificial increase in the stock price caused by
the previous misrepresentation. Instead, according to Judge
Winter, there could have been no doubt that the offering, once
disclosed, would cause the market to react by taking away all
past price increases, given that it was "a tangible, high-profile,
and unmistakable negation" of the earlier statements," which
is what made the omission material in the first place.9" Judge
Winter then attacked the plaintiffs' inconsistent arguments
about the efficiency of the market in assimilating information:
The result of the present ruling is that appellants are allowed to
establish reliance in their pleadings by stressing the efficiency of the
market in Time Warner's shares [through fraud on the market]
while establishing scienter by positing a market that cannot absorb
a current registration statement's negation of weeks-old informa-
tion. 3
Judge Winter's dissent contains some powerful arguments
concerning the motive suggested by the plaintiffs, and even the
majority opinion raises substantial questions concerning
whether the motive that was described was plausible. That,
however, does not lead to Judge Winter's conclusion that the
complaint should have been dismissed. If, as he concludes, the
variable-price rights offering was indeed a material fact which
Time Warner was under a duty to disclose, it should not mat-
ter, at least at the pleading stage, why the company decided
not to disclose it. The point is, it did not. That should be
enough.
Under the Second Circuit's interpretation of Rule 9(b), the
ability to allege motive is of paramount importance. While
91 Id.
92 Id.
' Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 274-75 (Vinter, J., dissenting).
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scienter may be pled even in the absence of a clear motive "by
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the
defendant," courts have held that "the strength of the circum-
stantial allegations" in such an event "must be correspondingly
greater,"94 and hence, that plaintiffs "face a more stringent
standard for establishing fraudulent intent." Thus, unless
motive can be established, it becomes very difficult for plain-
tiffs to meet the pleading standard for scienter notwithstand-
ing Rule 9(b)'s provision that scienter may be alleged general-
ly.
While requiring motive to be pled, however, the courts
have established a standard for motive that is inconsistent
with reality, proclaiming that defendants' interests in enhanc-
ing their executive positions, compensation and prestige is an
insufficient motive for the commission of securities fraud.0s
The Fifth Circuit summed up this standard in Melder v. Mor-
ris:
The defendants' motive to commit securities fraud is not readily
apparent, as there is no allegation that any of the corporate defen-
dants actually profited from the allegedly inflated stock values or
the money raised from the two offerings. The plaintiffs therefore
face a tougher standard for establishing fraudulent intent'
Yet, there is no reason to believe that for individual defen-
dants, making themselves and their company look good by
increasing stock prices is not a sufficient motive for securities
fraud, even if defendants do not sell their stock and thereby
directly profit from the fraud. In fact, there is no reason to
believe that a defendant must always have a rational reason
for committing fraud. It might well be that a defendant simply
took steps which defrauded the public for completely irrational
or personal reasons that are not easily articulated or evaluated
in monetary terms. That does not mean that the actions in
" Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
11 Tucbman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing Beck, 820 F.2d at 50).
"4 See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1994) (allegation
that desire of defendants to "protect and enhance their executive positions and the
substantial compensation and prestige they obtained thereby" were insufficient to
establish a motive to commit securities fraud); Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068 (same).
" Melder, 27 F.3d at 1102 (citing Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068).
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question are any less fraudulent or that the defendant should
be any less liable under the securities laws. 8
The debate in Time Warner between Judges Newman and
Miner, for the majority, and Judge Winter, .in the dissent,
exemplifies the inherent difficulty in defining the motive, i.e.,
the internal thoughts, beliefs and motivations of defendants at
the pleading stage. At best, the requirement imposed on plain-
tiffs to allege motive leads to creative lawyering in which the
plaintiffs try to articulate all the many possible reasons the
defendants may have had for committing fraud while defen-
dants try to dispute them, when, in fact, it is impossible to
know prior to discovery what the motive was. In Time Warner,
for example, there may have been a simpler motive for the
decision not to disclose the contemplated rights offering. Time
Warner may have elected not to disclose the offering in the
hope that, if its negotiations with strategic partners were a
success, it would never come to pass. If those negotiations had
succeeded, the company would have been able to keep the
stock price up without ever having to reveal that they had
secretly been considering an alternative means by which to
raise cash. But the negotiations failed, and stockholders who
acquired stock prior to the announcement of the rights offering
did so at an artificially inflated price. It makes little sense to
force parties to debate internal thoughts and processes that
are entirely in the hands of the defendants prior to discov-
ery.99
" See, e.g., Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179, 185, 191 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Defendants argue that the alleged scheme would have been irra-
tional for defendants to follow since West-ward's failure was to be announced with.
in two years, and that therefore the alleged scheme cannot reasonably be inferred
from the facts alleged. This argument fails for two reasons: at the time of the
defendants' statements, defendants may not have expected to announce West.
ward's problems and irrational schemes have as much potential to defraud inves-
tors as do rational schemes.").
" It is for this very reason that courts permit plaintiffs to allege conspiracy
generally in antitrust cases, since evidence of the conspiracy is in the hands of the
conspirators. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 746 (1976) ("in antitrust cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands of the
alleged conspirators, dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for
discovery should be granted very sparingly") (citation omitted); Perington Whole-
sale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 1373 (10th Cir. 1979) (pleading on
information and belief held appropriate under Rule 8(a) in antitrust actions "where
the proof is in the hands of the alleged conspirators") (citation omitted); Ben
Sheftall Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Mirta de Perales, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1575, 1579
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Instead of requiring plaintiffs to plead sufficient facts from
which scienter can be strongly inferred, a more logical ap-
proach that does not entail reading the defendants' minds is to
require that plaintiffs' adequately particularize their allega-
tions of fraud. Plaintiffs should have to plead sufficient facts
from which it can be inferred that the statements alleged to be
false were untrue at the time they were made or that the omis-
sions were known at the time plaintiffs contend that they
should have been disclosed. In short, plaintiffs should be re-
quired only to plead the circumstances underlying their allega-
tions of fraud with sufficient particularity, not to construct
theories about what the defendants might have been thinking
at the time.
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected the Second Circuit's
"strong inference" test under Rule 9(b), concluding in In re
Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation that the test is facially in-
consistent with the declaration in the rule that knowledge "and
other condition of the mind may be averred generally," there-
fore holding that "plaintiffs may aver scienter generally, just
as the rule states-that is, simply by saying that scienter ex-
ists."' The court, however, did not discuss the merits of the
conclusion, but merely held that it had no choice, stating:
The Second Circuit's test may or may not have the effect of deter-
ring or weeding out "strike suits," which various courts have seen as
imposing undesirable social and economic costs. Whether the test
has such an effect is beside the point. We are not permitted to add
new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of
doing so. That is a job for Congress, or for the various legislative,
(S.D.Ga. 1992) ("Mhe Court is mindful that in antitrust actions, where the proof
is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, summary dismissals prior to
allowing the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted even more
sparingly.") (citation omitted); Capital Imaging Assoc. v. Mohawk Valley Medical
Assocs., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 669, 676 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (Because the proof of a con-
spiracy "is often in the hands of the conspirators, and the plaintiff may need an
opportunity to discover the facts," a defendant in an antitrust care "must meet a
more stringent standard" to dismiss a case under Rule 12(b)(6).).
"' 42 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit also found that the
Second Circuit's test was inconsistent with Rule 22 of the English Rules of Prac-
tice of 1937, which was the model for Rule 9(b). The English Rule provides:
"Whenever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, Imowledge, or other
condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a
fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred."
Id. at 1545 (quoting The Annual Practice, Order 19, Rule 22 (1937)).
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judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending the
Federal Rules."'
Thus, the decision does little to support a rejection of the
strong inference test on policy grounds, but merely invites
Congress to take up the challenge and pass more stringent
pleading rules under section 10(b) and Rule 9(b). Yet, there is
a valid reason to reject the test. It simply does not make sense
to require a plaintiff to plead what one can never really know:
what is in the minds of the defendants.
To the extent the courts or Congress reject the "strong
inference" test and follow the Ninth Circuit's lead in permit-
ting scienter to be pled generally as called for under Rule 9(b),
the focus will turn from whether scienter has been pled ade-
quately to whether plaintiffs have pled sufficiently the exis-
tence of misrepresentations or omissions. In Glenfed, the court
summarized the standard:
To allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must set forth more
than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The
plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about the state-
ment, and why it is false. In other words, the plaintiff must set forth
an explanation as to why the statement or omission complained of
was false or misleading. A plaintiff might do less and still identify
the statement complained of; indeed, the plaintiff might do less and
still set forth some of the circumstances of the fraud. But the plain-
tiff cannot do anything less and still comply with Rule 9(b)'s man-
date to set forth with particularity those circumstances which consti-
tute fraud."2
In Judge Norris's concurring opinion in Glenfed, he sup-
ported the majority's conclusion with respect to pleading scien-
ter generally, but raised the concern that the court's standard
for pleading fraud extended well beyond existing law, creating
what he termed "an inference of falsity" test "by requiring the
pleading of evidentiary facts giving rise to an inference that
the allegedly fraudulent statements were false when
made.""3 Although his conclusion that an "inference of falsi-
"I Id. at 1546. The court cited in support of this position the recent conclusion
in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1448 (1994), that "[tihe issue . . . is not whether imposing private civil liability on
aiders and abettors [of securities fraud] is good policy but whether aiding and
abetting is covered by the statute." Id.
112 Id. at 1548.
103 Id. at 1557. Judge Norris's concern was that this would require plaintiffs to
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ty" test is being imposed may be correct, he appears to distin-
guish the majority's holding from existing law unnecessarily.
While Judge Norris argues that the requirement that
plaintiffs "set forth an explanation as to why the statement or
omission complained of was false or misleading" goes too
far,"lo' it in fact seems quite consistent with the current state
of the law. The courts already require that plaintiffs do more
than merely assert that a representation is false; they must
"explain why the statements were fraudulent" 5 or "give par-
ticulars as to the respect in which plaintiff contends the
statements were fraudulent.""'8 In other words, plaintiffs can-
not merely identify statements and give conclusory allegations
that they were false because of their inconsistency with subse-
quent disclosures-that is "fraud by hindsight." 7 Rather,
they must demonstrate that defendants "knew or should have
known [the alleged misrepresentations] to be false at the time
they were made.""' A plaintiff who is able to show that
much should be able to pursue the cause of action. Plaintiffs
should not also have to identify independently a basis for infer-
ring defendants' scienter for committing the fraud that has
been alleged.
Proponents of securities reform undoubtedly will argue
that adherence to the suggestions made in this Article will
plead evidentiary matter in their complaints in order to avoid dismissal, contra-
dicting Rule 8's prescription of a short and plain statement of the facts. Rather
than using Rule 9(b) to require sufficient facts to be pled to avoid frivolous litiga-
tion, Judge Norris proposed that plaintiffs be permitted more freedom in pleading
securities fraud claims but that courts exercise greater control over the litigation
by keeping plaintiffs from using excessive discovery to exert pressure on defen-
dants for settlements that exceed the true value of the care. Id. at 1555-57.
104 Judge Norris cites to Professor James Moore's statement that 'the pleader is
required to specify the time, place, and content of any allegedly false representa-
tion, the fact misrepresented, the identity of the perpetrator, and what was ob-
tained or given up as a consequence of the fraud." Ic. at 1559 (quoting 2A JAMES
W. MOORE, ET AL. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 9.03(1] (2d ed. 1972)). He then
argues that "[tihere is no requirement of making any kind of demonstration, no
need to state facts that 'explain why' or othervise substantiate the allegation of
falsity?7 Id.
"o' Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (Ist Cir. 1991). See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
10 Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).
1 See supra note 40 and accompany text.
1a0 Hnvsy v. Just Toys, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8077, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9382, -3-
4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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encourage frivolous litigation. Time Warner, itself, has already
been criticized as opening the door to more meritless lawsuits
through its conclusions about the duty of corporations to dis-
close alternate plans which are under "active and serious con-
sideration.""9 But by implementing Rule 9(b)'s requirement
of pleading fraud with particularity, courts can adequately
deter frivolous lawsuits without imposing the unnecessary and
illogical hurdle of pleading scienter with specificity.
The most important result is that a cause of action would
be sustained whenever plaintiffs are able to plead with suffi-
cient particularity that a materially false statement was made
to the public, thereby artificially inflating the price of stock
and misleading the public. Otherwise, fraud will not be de-
terred. Requiring further specificity with regard to the
defendant's motivations at the time it made such fraudulent
statements should not be required at this early stage of the
litigation.
As for the concern over frivolous litigation, a suit is not
frivolous if a material misrepresentation can be pled with
sufficient particularity. Even if a case is ultimately proven to
be invalid, that does not mean that the original lawsuit had no
merit. If actual fraud is to be combatted, society must bear the
risk that some suits will be brought when fraud has not oc-
curred. The courts act as the ultimate protector in such situa-
tions. Moreover, the concern over the so-called "explosion"
110
of frivolous litigation is vastly overblown and does not justify
restricting what would otherwise be an appropriate standard
by which to plead securities fraud.
10. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 75, at 1021, which states:
By allowing the plaintiffs to proceed in their action without more than
speculative grounds for showing the scienter of Time Warner officials, the
Second Circuit has encouraged vexatious litigation. As a result, corporate
speech will be further chilled, and frivolous litigation will continue. In
the end, the losers will be the marketplace and those individuals who
invest in it, along with anyone seeking judicial relief in an already back-
logged federal court system.
110 See, e.g., Press Release by the American Electronics Association, AEA Sup-
ports Securities Litigation Bill Passed Today by House Commerce Committee, 1995
PR Newswire, Feb. 16, 1995 (quoting William T. Archery, President and CEO of
the American Electronics Association) [hereinafter "AEA Press Releasel.
(Vol. 61:593
DETERRNG FRAUD
HI. A CASE FOR THE STATUS Quo
Arguments in support of legislation designed to weaken
the securities laws suggest that virtually every case that is
brought under section 10(b) has no merit. After all, as these
arguments run, if securities litigations are uniformly frivolous
then there should be little concern if legislation is adopted to
discourage such suits. The problem with this analysis, howev-
er, is that there is little support for the bare assertion that the
suits are without merit. The fact is, fraud does occur.
In Senator Alfonse D'Amato's report in support of S. 240
he cites to the "lapproximately 300 securities lawsuits filed
each year," and, after pointing out that "almost 93% settle at
an average settlement cost of $8.6 million," boldly asserts that
"[t]hese cases are generally settled based not on the merits but
on the size of the defendant's pocketbook.""' Similarly, Rep-
resentative Christopher Cox, the author of the Republicans'
legislation in the House to "reform" the securities laws, claims
that "[legalized extortion by self-interested unethical strike
suit lawyers is a national outrage that has become intolera-
ble."' With virtually no basis for their position, Senator
D'Amato, Congressman Cox and other supporters of the legis-
lation are assuming that most of the litigation is without mer-
it. In other words, they are assuming the ultimate conclu-
sion-that securities class actions are frivolous-in order to
justify legislation to curb such litigation. Without that assump-
tion, the validity of their position weakens considerably. If, in
contrast, the litigation is worthwhile, then settlements averag-
ing $8.6 million are entirely reasonable and should be applaud-
ed. Indeed, in the largest cases where companies settle securi-
ties claims for multimillion-dollar amounts, it is difficult to
believe the defendants' claims that they were merely attempt-
ing to avoid defense costs."1
n Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,760.
Robert A. Rosenblatt, Orange County Residents Fight for the Right to Sue,
L.A. TRIEs, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (quoting
letter by Representative Christopher Cox issued in response to news conference
held to attack the Republicans' proposed legislation).
' The number of securities litigations in which the settlements are so high as
to belie any claim that they were merely designed to settle "frivolous" laims are
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While the extreme claims of Senator D'Amato and Repre-
sentative Cox can be attributed more to political exigencies
than to a true understanding of the issues involved, even calm-
er voices by advocates of securities reform make similar, albeit
less emotional, assertions. For example, Saul S. Cohen, a vocal
advocate of such "reforms," recently testified before Congress
that:
The abuses of securities class action suits have been widely reported
in recent years. It has been noted that these suits are filed not be-
cause an individual has approached a law firm seeking to redress a
perceived wrong or even because a law firm has reason to believe
that a fraud has occurred. Rather, a law firm simply observes a
large drop in the price of a particular stock, identifies an individual
who owns shares of that stock (often from a pre-existing computer
database created expressly for that purpose) and files a class action
complaint accusing the company or its officers and directors of
fraud. Cases are filed within days or even hours of an announce-
ment which causes a drop in the price of a company's stock, making
it apparent that no investigation of any type could have been done.
The complaints themselves often consist of nothing more than
boilerplate allegations of fraud supplemented by a few public state-
ments of company officials which proved to be overly optimistic in
light of the company's results."
legion. For example, settlements in only those cases in which the author's firm,
Pomerantz Haudek Block & Grossman, was lead or co-lead counsel include the
following: In re National Health Lab. Sec. Litig., CV-92-1949-B (S.D. Cal. 1995)
($64 nillion cash recovery); In re Salomon Brothers Sec. Treasury Litig., No. 91
Civ. 5471, (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ($100 million cash recovery); ; In re First Executive
Corp. Sec. Litig., CV-8 9-71 35 DT (C.D.Cal. 1994) ($56 million partial settlement);
In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig., M.D.L. Docket No. 712 (D.Conn. 1994)
(over $66 million benefit including $16 million cash recovery plus over $50 million
reduction in class members' indebtedness on promissory notes); Hurley v. FDIC,
Civil Action No. 88-1940-T (D. Mass. 1992) ($29 million judgment after trial
against two former officers of First Service Bank for Savings); Wool v. Tandem
Inc., Civ. No. C 85134 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ($16 million recovery); In re AM Intl, Inc.
Sec. Litig., M-21-31, MDL Docket No. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ($23 million recovery);
In re Data Point Sec. Litig., SA-82-CA-338 (W.D.Tex. 1987) ($28.4 million recov-
ery); Kaplan v. General Motors Corp., 81 Civ. 1252 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ($22.5 million
recovery); In re National Student Marketing Sec. Litig., MDL Docket No. 105
(D.D.C. 1983) ($35 million recovery); In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
Shareholders Litig., Civ. No. 11898 (Del. Ch. 1991) ($38 million cash benefit); In
re Freeport-McMoRan Inc. Shareholders Litig., Civil Action No. 11667 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 1990) ($25.4 million recovery); In re Telerate, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Civ.
1115 (Del. Ch. 1989) ($95 million benefit). This list, of course, excludes many other
noteworthy cases involving multimillion dollar settlements, as well as numerous
cases with substantial settlements where Pomerantz Haudek was not lead counsel.
"" Statement of Saul S. Cohen Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
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Even Cohen's concerns, however, have already been ad-
dressed by the courts. If complaints are brought that "consist
of nothing more than boilerplate allegations of fraud supple-
mented by a few public statements of company officials which
proved to be overly optimistic in light of the company's re-
sults," they are dismissed."' Plaintiffs need to do much more
to sustain a cause of action. Since plaintiffs' firms sue on a
contingency basis-earning fees only if they obtain a recovery
through a settlement or otherwise and, even then, only with
court approval-they have little incentive to waste their re-
sources suing companies without some reasonable basis for
doing so." 6
In addition to the fact that the courts are already dismiss-
ing the lawsuits attacked by "reformers" such as Cox and Co-
hen, it is evident that securities litigations are not merely
automatic reactions to declining stock prices. 7 From 1986
through 1992, lawsuits were filed on only 4.7 percent of the
and Finance Commerce Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Fed. News
Service, Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, FEDNEW File (here-
inafter "Cohen Statement"]. Cohen is a partner at the New York law firm of
Rosenman and Colin and generally represents firms that are subject to securities
fraud suits.
"1 See Cohen Statement, supra note 114, at *1. In Cohen's testimony, for exam-
ple, he cites as "illustrative of this problem" the In re Philip Morris Securities
Litigation where the court criticized the plaintiffs for filing a complaint shortly
after a drop in prices and even including a typographical error from a previous
case misidentiying the main business of the defendant. Id. The court recognized
the issue, and it dismissed the complaint. Obviously, congressional intervention
was not necessary; the court took the necessary action under the current law.
u" While it cannot be denied that the current system encourages a "race to the
courthouse" by plaintiffs' counsel seeking to position themselves for leadership
positions in major fraud litigations, that does not suggest that the lawsuits them-
selves are without merit. Indeed, with the computer resources available to firms
today it is not surprising that it takes little time after a public announcement to
determine whether it is reasonable to believe that there was underlying fraud.
I7 "Reformers" insist that securities litigation is triggered by market losses.
Cohen Statement, supra note 114. See also Sen. Hearings, cited in Seligman, cupra
note 48, at 442 n.16 (citing statement of Richard J. Egan, Chairman of EMC
Corp., claiming that strike suits "are typically filed within days or cometimes
hours of a company's announcement of adverse news and disappointing earnings');
id. at 442 n.17 (citing statement of Edward R. McCracken, President, Silicon
Graphics, stating that "companies can be exposed to potential litigation whenever
the stock price falls by approximately 10.%, even if there's absolutely no violation
of security laws or fiduciary responsibility"); id. (citing statement of Thomas
Dunlap, Jr., General Counsel of Intel Corp., referring to "automatic" 10% rule).
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occasions on which companies' stock declined by more than ten
percent in one day, indicating that class-action attorneys do
not simply sue every time stock prices decline."8 Similarly,
there is little merit to the oft-repeated accusation that
plaintiffs' lawyers have contributed to an "explosion" of litiga-
tion accusing law-abiding companies of securities fraud."'
Contrary to the suggestion that securities fraud cases repre-
sent a substantial cause of the judicial backlog existing
throughout the country, an average of only 123 consolidated
securities litigations were filed annually between 1989 and
1992, although more than 17,400 companies file reports with
the SEC each year.120 As Senator D'Amato stated before de-
ciding to champion the cause of the "reformers" in the Senate,
the number of securities fraud cases actually filed "doesn't
seem like an explosion." The facts are "far different than the
picture described-that whenever there is a glitch in the mar-
ket, everyone is the subject of a frivolous securities suit
and... companies can be blackmailed into paying a settle-
ment.""' If there is a problem with excess litigation in this
country, it may well derive more from businesses themselves
engaging in intrabusiness litigation than from the relatively
few securities actions that are brought.
The number of securities fraud cases actually filed each
year belies any need to "reform" the securities laws. Propo-
nents of such reform nevertheless argue that those cases which
are brought cost millions of dollars in unnecessary legal ex-
118 Seligman, supra note 48, at 443 n.19 (citing a report of an economics expert
retained by a plaintiffs' securities firm to examine the number of times a company
trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange or
NASDAQ has been sued after its stock fell by more than 10% in one day). This
number is also inflated by'reporting all cases filed rather than merely all compa-
nies which were sued, thereby not discounting multiple suits against one company.
Id.
119 See, e.g., AEA Press Release, supra note 110 ("This bill is the right answer
for reducing the explosion of securities litigation that has strangled technology
firms throughout the country .... Most of these cases have no merit and only
end up paralyzing technology companies-thereby hurting their stockholders and
employees.") (quoting William T. Archey, AEA's President and CEO).
20 Seligman, supra note 48, at 444 (citing a report of an economics expert re-
tained by a plaintiffs' securities firm). The annual number of securities fraud law-
suits filed from 1989 through 1992 totalled 169, 326, 256 and 265, respectively.
The numbers of individual companies sued were substantially smaller, totalling
only 108, 151, 122 and 113, respectively. Id.
12 See Seligman, supra note 48, at 444.
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penses and often are settled, without regard to the merits,
solely to avoid the expense and risks of defending "frivolous"
suits. Such claims, however, are based more on rhetoric than
on empirical proof. As Professor Joel Seligman has demonstrat-
ed impressively, there is no valid evidence to support the claim
that merits have no bearing on settlements.' While some
studies have been cited which purportedly suggest that settle-
ments are not affected by the merits, they are universally
limited in their relevance as a result of flaws in their assump-
tions, including how to measure the damages so as to be able
to compare them to the ultimate settlement that is
reached.'e Yet, proponents of limiting the scope of the securi-
ties laws accept such studies without reservation. 24
Moreover, there is just as much evidence suggesting that the
merits underlying securities actions have a substantial bearing
on settlements.'
"' See Seligman, supra note 48, at 445. See also Lester B. Snyder & Jerry G.
Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class Action Litigation and Pension Plan
Tax Policy: What's Really at Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 123, 126-28 (1993) (contend-
ing that studies concluding merits do not matter were flawed and ignored the
oversight provided by courts); Adam F. Ingber, Note, 10b-5 or Not lob.5?: Are the
Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
351, 360-61 (1993) (rejecting conclusion that merits do not matter in settlements).
22 Seligman, supra note 48, at 450.52. Seligman explains in substantial detail
the flaws in the studies most often cited by proponents of restricting the securities
laws, including Vincent E. O'Brien & Richard W. Hodges, A Study of Cloa Action
Securities Fraud Cases 1988-1993, summarized in Sen. Hearings at 46-48, 138-141;
Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita 11 Juneja, Recent Trends in Sccurities Class Action
Suits (1992); Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita A. Juneja, Recent Trends I. What Ex-
plains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? (1993), reprinted in Sen. Hear-
ings, at 739-75; and Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settle.
ments in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 501 (1991). Sec also
Nicholal E. Chimides & Kathleen P. Balon, As.essing the Need For Class Action
Reform, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYLAWJ File
(summarizing the flaws in the various studies suggesting that merits do not mat-
ter in securities fraud settlements).
"2 In supporting S. 240, for example, Senator D'Amato relies on studies which
purportedly conclude that investors recovered only 7 to 14 cents for every dollar
lost as a result of securities fraud. Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,758.
Such studies, however, depend entirely on how the ultimate damages are valued.
If the defendants' estimates of damages were used, the percentage of recovery for
damages would undoubtedly be substantially higher. Indeed, given that defendants
often claim that they caused virtually no damages, it could be argued that most
settlements compensate investors for virtually their entire loss. The important fact
to recognize is that the numbers used by proponents of limiting plaintiffs actions
are often without empirical support, being misused for partisan purposes.
22 Seligman, supra note 48, at 453-54. See also Steven P. Marino & Rende D.
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Another argument often raised by proponents of reform is
that businesses are seriously harmed by the expense of defend-
ing frivolous litigation. Senator D'Amato, for example, has
publicly exclaimed that "[firivolous lawsuits... are making it
difficult for companies to raise the capital needed to fuel our
economy, 116 and, in his report in support of S. 240, has adopt-
ed the position that the number of securities class actions have
had "an in terrorem effect on Corporate America," adding "sig-
nificantly to the cost of raising capital and represent[ing] a
'litigation tax' on business."127 Yet, at the same time, the ac-
tual numbers which he cites in his report directly contradict
such dire assertions:
The United States securities markets are the most liquid and deep
in the world. In just the past ten years, capital raised has risen
1,000%. Over the last three years, the U.S. securities industry has
set new records in corporate underwriting and raising capital for
new business. In 1994, the industry raised $1 trillion for businesses,
including $34 billion for small businesses making their first foray
into the capital markets."
The evidence, in short, simply does not support the assertion
Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Action Settlements Involving
Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 1115 (1994), cited in
Seligman, supra note 48, at 454 n.72 (finding that accountants paid an average of
$10.5 million per settlement where "flagrant fraud" was alleged, compared with
$2.1 million for all other cases); Letter from John B. Torkelson, President, Prince-
ton Venture Research Inc. (June 15, 1993), reprinted in Sen. Hearings at 153,
cited in Seligman, supra note 48, at 454 n.73 (estimating that recoverable damages
were equal to 27.7% of investor market losses and thereby concluding based on
cases in which PVR served as a consultant that settlements were equal to 59.78%
of recoverable damages after fees and expenses); Sen. Hearings at 172-82, 783-92,
cited in Seligman, supra note 48, at 454 n.73, citing data from the tvo largest
class action claims administrators reporting that settlements, on average, equalled
24.6% of market losses. Seligman notes that these studies also suffer from flaws
which limit the significance of the conclusions to be drawn from them. Seligman,
supra note 48, at 454.
" David Skidmore, Senate Passes Bill to Curb Frivolous Securities Fraud Suits,
AP WORLDSTREAM, June 28, 1995.
Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 89,760.
Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,759 (footnote omitted). As Professor
Seligman has noted, the data demonstrate that securities registrations, including
initial public offerings, have continued to rise, leading to the conclusion that,
"[dlespite claims that litigation is destroying capital formation, capital formation
remains healthy." Seligman, supra note 48, at 440 (citing, inter alia, the SEC's
1992 report that the total dollar amount of securities filed for registration reached
$700 billion, a 40% increase over the prior year, while the number of initial public
offerings increased some 53% to $66.5 billion).
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that securities litigation is harming corporate America. Rather,
it indicates that the capital markets are working well; compa-
nies are continuing to develop new products and raise capital
by the billions.
In fact, the threat of litigation in the event of fraud may
be part of the reason our capitalist system is working so well.
Without investor confidence in the integrity of the markets,
businesses would not have been able to attract the substantial
amount of investments they have received, and without a via-
ble and effective plaintiffs' bar to deter fraud, that confidence
could be lost. Even Senator D'Amato has conceded that "[tihe
success of the U.S. securities markets is largely the result of a
high level of investor confidence in the integrity and efficiency
of our markets," acknowledging that "[tihe SEC enforcement
program and the availability of private rights of action togeth-
er provide a means for defrauded investors to recover damages
and a powerful deterrent against violations of the securities
laws."' As noted in the comments of Senators Paul S.
Sarbanes, Richard W. Bryan and Barbara Boxer in opposition
to S. 240:
Our securities markets have been operating under the Federal secu-
rities laws since those laws were enacted over 60 years ago [and]
our markets today are the largest and most vibrant in the world.
This is so not in spite of the Federal securities laws, but in part
because of the Federal securities laws.... Even more important to
ensuring the success of our markets is investor confidence. That
confidence is maintained because investors know they have effective
remedies against persons who would defraud them."
Of course companies do spend substantial sums to defend
Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 89,760.
Report No. 104-98, supra note 7, at 86,777. The logical conclusion that
strong securities laws enhances the viability of capital markets is supported by
efforts to build such markets in eastern-bloc nations. Bulgaria, for instance has
recently passed a new Stock Exchange Securities Act as part of its effort to en-
courage its own capital markets. Consultants, however, stress the need to adopt
additional rules to prevent market manipulation in order to add 'the ingredient of
investor confidence." Elisaveta Konstantinova, Bulgaria Need. Better Mark.et Rul4W.
Consultants, REUTERS, July 6, 1995, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN
File (quoting Robert Finney, a partner in U.-based law firm, Denton Hall). As
Denton explained, "[tjhere is a need to back up the securities litigation with
amendments to the criminal code which would impose proper penalties against
[the] securities fraud, deception, [and] market manipulation that one expects to see
in any market." Id,
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cases, but the expense of defending against meritorious litiga-
tion is hardly inappropriate. As for the amount spent litigating
what could be considered frivolous cases, there is little empiri-
cal evidence to suggest that companies are actually harmed
beyond the fact that some additional money was spent. The
issue is not whether companies could have saved money by
avoiding litigation expenses. Obviously, they could have. The
real question is whether the benefits of a system that can
adequately deter fraud outweigh the benefits of a system that
discourages both frivolous and meritorious fraud suits.
Professor Seligman's analysis has been critiqued by a
noted supporter of securities reform, Professor Joseph
Grundfest, who questions some of the conclusions Seligman
draws from the data. Significantly, however, Grundfest is not
able to muster the evidence to prove a need for reform. Rather,
he merely concludes that we do not know one way or the other:
At the end of the day, and despite recent congressional hearings, we
simply do not know enough about the securities litigation process to
propound categorical reforms with any degree of confidence that we
would be doing more good than harm."'
In this light, it is difficult to see how proponents of reform can
justify their current proposals. Without having sufficient evi-
dence to change the current system, the old saying could well
be true: the cure will be worse than the disease.
Unfortunately, the unproven rhetoric used by companies
seeking to emasculate the securities laws is too often accepted
without scrutiny, even by the courts. In Central Bank of Den-
ver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, for example, the Su-
preme Court opined that:
[E]xcessive litigation can have ripple effects. [N]ewer and smaller
companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals. A
professional may fear that a newer or smaller company may not sur-
vive and that business failure would generate securities litigation
against the professional, among others. In addition, the increased
costs incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settle-
ment costs under 10b-5 may be passed on to their client companies,
and in turn incurred by the company's investors, the intended bene-
ficiaries of the statute."'
Joseph A. Grundfest, Commentary, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727,
746 (1995).
132 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994) (citing Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Em.
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While the concerns expressed by the Court might arise if un-
necessary litigation could not be addressed adequately by the
courts, there is simply no evidence to suggest that courts today
are unable to avoid these gloomy predictions by implementing
existing law effectively.
Plaintiffs' securities lawyers have a difficult time defend-
ing against such excessive (and unsupported) assertions. It is
simply too easy for politicians to assert that most securities
cases are "frivolous" with little fear of being held accountable
for their vast exaggeration, if not outright misstatement. After
all, there is little substantial means by which to respond to the
proposition that "most class actions have little merit" when
such a claim is not based on specific cases which can be ad-
dressed. Moreover, even with respect to particular cases, the
hands of the plaintiffs' attorney are often tied. As a matter of
course, defendants require plaintiffs to enter into strict confi-
dentiality agreements prior to agreeing to produce documents
and to return or destroy all such documents upon the conclu-
sion of a case. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys are generally unable
to respond to vague public attacks on the validity of their suits
by pointing to specific evidence of fraud that they have uncov-
ered. The cases are also sufficiently complex that it is difficult
to compete with the sound-bite attacks against class actions in
the media.
Even based on the limited arguments available to counter
the rhetorical attacks, however, it cannot be disputed that
cases of substantial fraud are widespread. Investors have
witnessed "financial frauds and scandals of historic propor-
tions" during the last decade, and small investors are being
"victimized" every day in 'less notorious-but equally devastat-
ing-cases of fraud and abuse.""c According to Mark Griffin,
powering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in
America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948 (1993)).
' Griffin Testimony, supra note 7 (citing "[m]assive misconduct on the part of
Prudential Securities in the sale of limited partnerships; Steven Wymer; BCCI and
BNL; Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings; the savings and loan debacle; wide-
spread fraud uncovered as a result of the FBI sting operation at the Chicago
commodities markets; the so-called 'Den of Thieves? ring of junk-bond kings: Mi-
chael iken, Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine and larty Siegel; and the Salomon
Brothers fraud in the government securities marketplace"). Novi, with the current
litigation revolving around the Orange County debacle, and other investigations
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testifying on behalf of the North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association, "[ilt is against this backdrop that the
broader and more complex issues raised by proponents of liti-
gation 'reform' must be considered."" Nor can it be disputed
that substantial recoveries are obtained in many securities
litigations that cannot be attributed to a company's effort
merely to avoid defending against frivolous claims.s The on-
ly question, then, is whether it is worth risking the ability to
fight widespread fraud, by effectively deterring plaintiffs from
bringing suits in the first instance, in order to prevent some
small number of cases which defendants label as frivolous.
The risk of restricting shareholders' ability to combat
fraud through private litigation becomes especially critical in
light of the heavy burden already placed on regulators who are
not in a position to replace the efforts of private attorneys
general. As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has stated: 'We have
neither the resources nor the desire to replace private plain-
tiffs in policing fraud; it makes more sense to let private forces
continue to play a key role in deterrence than to vastly expand
the commission's role."13 And the likelihood of the regulators
getting the necessary resources to assume such an expanded
role is slim, at best. 37 Thus, there will be nothing to fill the
into the use of derivatives, the continued need to protect investors against fraud is
more important than ever. The Orange County situation has already led to certain
representatives expressing additional concern over efforts to weaken the federal
securities laws. See Senator Barbara Boxer, Financial Lessons of the Orange Coun-
ty Bond Crises, Fed. Document Clearing House, Inc., Congressional Press Releases,
Jan. 25, 1995, available in, LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File ("ITihe courtroom
door must be kept open to victims of securities fraud. Provisions in the Republican
'Contract with America,' if adopted, would make sweeping changes to the laws
that protect investors who may have been misled or lied to or defrauded .... It
is important to note .. .that the proposals in the Republican 'Contract' go far
beyond what is necessary to limit frivolous suits. The Republican proposals would
make it difficult-if not impossible-for legitimate victims of securities fraud to
seek a remedy.").
"24 Griffin Testimony, supra note 7.
226 See supra note 113.
" Rob Wells, Taking Aim at Securities Lawsuits: Shareholders Would Suffer
under New Limits on Fraud Complaints, Foes Say, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
July 9, 1995, at H1.
" The risk becomes even more pronounced when considering that, at the same
time the securities laws are being restricted, the funding for securities regulators
is becoming tighter. See, e.g., THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 6, 1995, at 14A
("The timing of this legislation (S. 240) is particularly unfortunate because Con.
gress also is cutting funding for regulators. The overworked Securities and Ex-
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void left by a plaintiffs' bar discouraged from aggressively
pursuing securities fraud by the new legislation.
It also is presumptuous of litigation-reform proponents to
suggest that most of the costs of litigating securities actions
are caused by plaintiffs' firms. Our adversarial system presup-
poses that each party will be represented by advocates arguing
their positions. While companies claim that frivolous litigations
result in unnecessary defense costs, what they fail to acknowl-
edge is that frivolous defenses to valid claims have perhaps an
even greater impact on the costs and delays inherent in litiga-
tion. Defense firms universally choose to file substantial mo-
tions to dismiss or for summary judgment, even for cases
which clearly satisfy the pleading standards with valid under-
lying claims. Defense attorneys also oppose class certification
even in the most routine situations and usually attempt to
delay or stymie legitimate discovery efforts. As a result, cases
involving even the most obvious fraud take years to litigate
and often result in settlements below what investors should, in
all fairness, receive. In response to the argument that
plaintiffs' firms file frivolous suits in order to "extort" settle-
ments, it can just as easily be asserted that defendants delay
litigation and file frivolous defenses in order to force plaintiffs
to accept low settlements.13
Plaintiffs' attorneys also have reason to object to the ad
hominem attacks on the morality of their profession and the
protest that they make too much money through their "legal-
ized extortion." Although plaintiffs' attorneys, on the whole, do
well financially, they certainly do no better on average than
defense counsel who earn substantial fees on an hourly basis
by defending corporations from allegations of fraud." De-
change Commission can't begin to keep up with all the fraud on Wall Street. At
least the threat of lawsuits by investors helped maintain some law and order.");
THE ATLANTA J. & CONsr., July 2, 1995, at 2R ("South Carolina Gov. David
Beasley has signed legislation that slashes the state's funding for fighting ecuni-
ties fraud at a time when authorities are in the midst of a major investigation of
NationsBank's brokerage arm. The cuts will have 'a dramatic and drastic' effect on
the ability of the state's six-person securities division to guard against fraud, said
Secretary of State Jim illes, the state's top securities regulator.").
"' For example, while defendants claim that the number of motions to dismiss
which are granted suggest that frivolous cases have been brought. plaintiffs could
easily respond that the number of motions denied suggest that frivolous motions
to dismiss were brought. It simply depends on the perspective of the speaker.
" The Aerican Lawyer's annual survey of law firm earnings, for example,
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fense firms do not represent only "innocent" companies, but
often assert vociferous defenses on behalf of clients that are
guilty of the most heinous fraud. 4 ' Indeed, it can easily be
argued that the "best" client for the defense bar is one that
commits serious fraud, so that years of private litigation and
negotiation with securities regulators and even U.S. Attorneys
will be required prior to the resolution of the matter, resulting
in huge time-based attorney's fees. Corporate officials them-
selves make more than their attorneys and often without re-
gard to the benefit they are bringing to their shareholders, 41
to say nothing of the millions provided to investment bankers,
many of whom do not contribute to the nation's wealth in any
real way but merely participate in large-scale gambling on
interest rates and other indices upon which they choose to risk
their investments.142
reports that partners at the top New York defense firms earn, on average, over a
million dollars per year. Karen Dillon, Brand Names at the Brink, AM. LAW., May
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AMLWR file. Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel
work only on contingency fees. Thus, they are paid only if there is a settlement.
In the current climate, where many cases are dismissed, attorneys have no incen-
tive to bring cases which they know are meritless-such cases would simply cost
time and money with no reward.
10 See, e.g., supra note 113 (listing substantial settlements and citing cases).
141 See, e.g., In a Cost-Cutting Era, Many CEOs Enjoy Imperial Perks, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 7, 1995, § B, at 1 (highlighting substantial perks provided to corporate
executives even when the companies they represent are losing money; citing the
$723,000 salary, substantial perks, and special deals worth millions of dollars
received by the chairman of Tyson Foods, which reported a net loss of $2.1 mil-
lion; and the $580,000 salary, support staff and a reimbursement for expenses re-
ceived by the chairman and CEO of ICN Pharmaceuticals while he took a leave of
absence to serve as prime minister of Yugoslavia, all while the company was re-
porting a loss of $183.6 million).
"' As a prime example of the Wall Street mentality, Kidder Peabody paid Jo-
seph Jett $9 million in bonuses in 1993, all for profits he purportedly earned the
company by buying and selling zero-coupon bonds and arbitraging interest rates.
Of course, the profits ultimately proved to be illusory and merely reflected paper
profits which had no connection to reality, but even if they had been real, they
did not result from creating jobs or providing a service, but merely manipulating
interest rates on government bonds. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Kidder Reports Fraud
and Ousts a Top Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File. See also Thomas L. Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation,
or Gambling?-Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the
Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 987, 1006-07 (1992) ("Futures and
options contracts are also noteworthy in that they do not produce wealth, but
instead merely involve the transfer of wealth. Futures and options contracts are
geared to reallocating risks among market participants, not to amassing capital.
By way of comparison, the securities markets are designed to facilitate firms in
(Vol. 61:5693
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In sum, the attacks on the earnings of plaintiffs' counsel
should be taken for what they are-partisan rhetoric. Such
emotional appeals against plaintiffs' lawyers have no rational
relationship to the issue of whether the securities laws should
be reformed. The question is not whether plaintiffs' attorneys
have a profit motive. They do. That is why the plaintiffs' bar is
strong enough to stand up to the substantial resources of cor-
porations that commit fraud. In many ways, the same profit
incentives that encourage companies to develop also work to
encourage attorneys to operate as private attorneys general
who can assist in the effort to combat fraud. The real issue
should be whether the profit motive inherent in the current
system serves investors and the society at large by providing
the incentive for attorneys to work to ferret out fraud. There is
little question that it does. The reforms currently being advo-
cated seek to remove much of that profit motive, thereby re-
moving the incentive to enforce the securities laws through
private actions.
Ultimately, the evidence does not support the securities-
reform advocates. There is no evidence that the securities laws
have contributed to a litigation explosion that hampers U.S.
businesses, and no indication that plaintiffs' lawyers have be-
come rich by extorting settlements of frivolous litigation. The
broad acceptance of these charges arises from what appears to
be a nationwide backlash against lawyers in general, encour-
aged by well-funded public relations and lobbying efforts of the
very companies that the securities laws are designed to regu-
late.43
CONCLUSION
Fraud is a reality, and providing incentives for plaintiffs'
lawyers to sue on behalf of injured investors is a critical tool
both for compensating investors and for deterring fraud. At the
same time, Rule 9(b) provides courts with the power to deter
frivolous litigation by enforcing its pleading requirements, a
power that courts willingly use.
raising funds for expansion and other productive purpoms, thereby indirectly con-
tributing to the creation of wealth.").
14 See supra note 10.
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This Article does not argue, of course, that suits without
adequate basis do not exist. Nor is it meant to suggest that
problems in the system do not contribute to costs and delays
without serving the interest of deterring fraud."' Rather, it
suggests that, even with such problems, the system is working.
Neither the proposed reforms nor more stringent interpreta-
tions of the law by the couits is necessary. Indeed, under ei-
ther approach, there will be a substantial risk of increased
fraud without sufficient recourse for the victims. When base-
less cases are brought, courts should continue to dismiss them
and, if appropriate, sanction attorneys who bring frivolous
claims.'45 The primary focus of the courts, however, should
not be on deterring frivolous suits. That deterrence will be
accomplished through appropriate application of the law. The
focus should be on permitting cases to be brought to deter
fraud-the underlying purpose of the securities laws.
144 For example, there can be no dispute that plaintiffs' firms benefit by becom-
ing lead counsel in class action litigations. To do so, under the current system,
being one of the first to file enhances the possibility of assuming a leadership
position in the case. Hence, there is a "race to the courthouse." Whether this
situation can be addressed in a manner which does not deter worthy cases, howev-
er, is an open question.
4' Courts have authority under Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to "impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties"
which the court finds to have submitted frivolous claims. To the extent that frivo-
lous litigation in fact becomes a problem, courts have the discretion under this
provision to act accordingly.
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